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THE GIDEONS AND THE GALLOWS:
AGAINST THE "TYPICAL JUROR"
STANDARD IN CAPITAL CASES
"[Ilt makes no jurisprudential sense to utilize an artificial
legal device in order to assess the prejudicial impact of the
biblical passages upon the jury's verdict. Indeed, since we
know from the record that the extraneous evidence was not
actually prejudicial ... insistence on reversing [the] death
sentence by finding a reasonable probability of prejudice
with reference to a "typical" jury is unwarranted."1
INTRODUCTION
The Gideons almost killed Robert Eliot Harlan. Or so the Colorado
Supreme Court thought. Without the court's intercession, Harlan
faced the death penalty for his murder of Rhonda Maloney and
paralyzing assault on her would-be rescuer Jacquie Creazzo.2 After
post-verdict interviews revealed that jurors consulted a Bible in the
jury room, the Colorado Supreme Court reduced Harlan's sentence to
life. The court thought the presence of the Biblical text posed a
"reasonable possibility" of bias against Harlan to the "typical juror."
The Colorado Supreme Court used this test despite evidence that the
Biblical passages did not actually bias the actual jurors against
Harlan, and despite its previous approval of Harlan's death sentence.3
Harlan's case, like many others, highlights inherent tensions between
the personal morality of jurors and the public administration of
I People v. Harlan (Harlan 11), 109 P.3d 616, 634 n.l (Colo. 2005) (Rice & Kourlis, JJ.,
dissenting).
2 James J. Kirkpatrick, Court Case Brings Moses to Colorado, AUGUSTA CHRONICAL
AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 25, 2005, at A4.
3 People v. Harlan (Harlan 1), 8 P.3d 448 (Colo. 2000).
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justice. This tension peaks in capital cases, like Harlan's. There,
sentencing jurors must make an "independent moral assessment" of
whether the considerations in favor of imposing death ("the
aggravating factors") outweigh the considerations against imposing
death ("the mitigating factors"). 4
This Note will discuss the merit of the typical juror test the
Colorado Supreme Court used in Harlan's case.5 The evidence rules
in most states require this approach. Most have a rule modeled after
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), barring inquiry into the substance of
jury deliberations, including the effect of extraneous information.6
Rule 606(b) forecloses an alternative approach-considering how the
evidence "actually affected" the jury.
The typical juror test works as follows. If the court finds out the
jury used extraneous information, it holds a hearing (referred to below
as the "prejudice hearing"), and questions the jurors to determine
what information they used. A court then overturns the jury's decision
(including a death sentence, in capital cases) if the jury used
extraneous information and the court decides that the information
posed an objectively reasonable likelihood of prejudice to the
defendant in the mind of a typical juror. In the hearing, the court bars
evidence of how that information actually affected the jury, but
admits evidence that merely characterizes the information. Even if
4 In a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury, the jury is called upon to make a
"highly subjective, 'unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular
person deserves." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 n.7 (1985) (quoting Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). The Supreme Court has
described the jurors' role in weighing aggravating and mitigating factors as a "reasoned moral
response." Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 46 (2004) (per curiam) (quoting Penry v. Johnson, 532
U.S. 782, 796 (2001)); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990) (holding that the
Constitution necessitates individualized moral assessments such as the one in Harlan's case).
Jurors are supposed to "make the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification
and that 'buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system."' McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (quoting HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
498 (1966)). In other cases, the Court has explained that jurors personally tie the "conscience of
the community" to the penal system. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987)
(noting that the juror's job is to tie the moral outrage of the community to the administration of
justice), overruled on other grounds, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968) (noting that a jury in a capital case is left to "express the
conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death."). I will use the term
"independent moral assessment" for the remainder of this Note to mean the juror's process of
attempting to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors and deciding whether or not to
choose death.
5 This Note will not discuss the impact of extraneous information on the guilt phase of a
capital trial, but rather on the sentencing phase. There, the jury weighs aggravating and
mitigating factors and decides whether to sentence the defendant to die.
6 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 606(b); COLO. R. EVID. 606(b). Throughout this Note, I will
refer to the federal rule and state rules mirroring it as "Rule 606(b)."
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questioning the jurors elicits "actual effect" testimony, the evidence is
inadmissible. Therefore, the court cannot judge the validity of the
sentence based on the actual effect of the extraneous information on
the jury.
Lack of admissibility, not lack of availability forecloses the actual
effect approach. Jurors often testify freely as to the actual effect of
extrinsic evidence at prejudice hearings.7 Attorneys typically do not
phrase their questions in these hearings so narrowly as to prevent the
jurors from doing so. 8 The backstop of Rule 606(b) prevents
admission of these answers from the jurors.9 So, courts could review
the sentence to see whether the information in question actually
influenced a juror's deliberations, if Rule 606(b) did not bar the court
from considering this evidence.
The unique nature of capital trials both helps explain why jurors
consult extraneous information, and (in part), why reviewing courts
should seek and use their testimony in assessing its effect. The
independent moral assessment requirement in capital cases asks the
jurors to refer to an external reference point-their own moral
sense-to balance the evidence in the record for and against death.
The instructions the court gives the jurors thereby invites each one to
seek out extraneous, potentially religious, material.' 0 The independent
moral assessment instruction also requires each juror to make an
intimately personal choice. Yet, when a court reviews that choice, it
cannot seek meaningful testimony from the chooser. It must instead
7 See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 248
(2d. ed 1994).
s This may not be the attorneys' fault. Actual effect testimony may come from questions
not designed to adduce it. A juror, in describing their experience in the jury room will likely
include details that describe the actual effect of extraneous information. See Fields v. Brown,
431 F.3d 1186, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Defendant] presented a number of juror declarations that
the district court ultimately struck to the extent that the information contained in them was
inadmissible under Rule 606(b)."); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2005)
(juror testimony showed that readings from the bible and prayers merely encouraged juror to
take their responsibility seriously); People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764, 771 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003)
("In summary, we discern a reasonable possibility that the introduction of extraneous
information about Paxil, in direct violation of the court's denial of the same request by the jury,
may well have influenced the verdict.").
9 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
10 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976) (plurality opinion) (White &
Rehnquist, JJ., Burger, C.J.) (arguing that mercy in capital cases involves "factors too intangible
to write into a statute"). Some object to this feature of capital sentencing because it deviates
from the "rule of law" when its protection is arguably needed most. For a defense of this feature,
see Laura S. Underkuffler, Agentic and Conscientic Decisions in Law: Death and Other Cases,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1734 (1998) (describing the death penalty decision as one
based on a "conscientic" model, where the judicial system (here the voice of the jury) must
speak what the law "should be" (rather than what it "is"), and that this is required because the
defendant's life is at stake).
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hypothesize about the juror's resolve and belief structure. Courts
facing a sentencing jury potentially tainted by extraneous information
may lament that they cannot use the jury's actual testimony about the
effect of it because of Rule 606(b)." This Note represents a first
attempt to describe and to justify using an actual prejudice test that is
bolstered by testimony from the actual jury about their deliberations
in capital sentencing.
By actual effect I mean the following: extraneous evidence that
"actually prejudice" the defendant in a capital case when the jury
finds an inappropriate aggravating factor from the extraneous
information, or the jury abandons altogether the task of weighing
aggravators and mitigators and substitutes them with the extraneous
information. 12
In sum, this Note's reasoning proceeds as follows. First, the
independent moral assessment instruction in capital cases both vests
each juror with an intimately personal choice and invites each juror to
consider extraneous information for moral guidance. 3 If the jury
views extraneous information, the court then must decide whether
that evidence prejudiced the defendant. Presently, courts test this by
I1 See, e.g., Harlan 11, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005) (Rice & Kourlis, JJ., dissenting). Actual
prejudice/effect can be surmised by a court without subjective effect testimony. Some courts use
an actual prejudice standard in cases of jury tampering where no new information is introduced
to the jury (e.g., an ex parte contact). See, e.g., Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 116 (1983) (per
curiam) (denying habeas relief after deeming a judge's contact with a juror was harmless);
United States v. Maree, 934 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir. 1991), superseded by statute on other
grounds, as stated in U.S. v. Adams, 432 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006) (granting a new trial
for a defendant convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine based upon ex parte contacts a
juror had with two friends, but still excluding evidence of the subjective effect on the juror's
deliberations). These cases did not admit evidence bearing on subjective effect. However, this
Note is the first argument for "actual prejudice" review in a capital sentencing, and the first to
attempt to justify admitting juror testimony on how the evidence affected their deliberations in
such cases. Throughout the Note, when I refer to the "actual effect test," etc., I mean actual
effect review through the mouthpiece of actual effect testimony.
12 This Note will not consider the case of extraneous information leading the jury to mercy
in a capital sentence when it should not have. The prosecution cannot appeal a life sentence to
seek the death penalty for Double Jeopardy. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101,
106-07 (2003) (holding that Double Jeopardy protection extends to capital sentencing that
require the prosecution to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt to support a sentence of death,
and that life imprisonment is tantamount to "acquittal" in these circumstances). Sattazahn dealt
with the state's ability to seek the death penalty on retrial. Sattazahn's jury hung during the
sentencing phase. The trial judge entered a life sentence. The state sought death on retrial, and
got it. The majority held that this did not violate double jeopardy. However, even the dissenters
in Sattazahn noted: "[tihe sentencing question can be retried-if retrial is not barred by the
Double Jeopardy clause-only if the defendant successfully appeals the underlying conviction
and is convicted again on retrial." Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting). Thus, even in rare cases like Sattazahn's, appeal, the defendant must first appeal to
open the door for the state to seek death.
13 Thus, the case studies this Note cites represent the most common scenarios of the
extraneous information problem in capital cases.
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asking whether the information posed a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice to the defendant in the mind of a typical juror. Asking the
jurors how the information actually affected them more precisely tests
prejudice. But other values are at stake. Courts use the typical juror
test because they value preventing harassment to the jury, the finality
of the jury's verdict or sentence, and seek to prevent damaging the
integrity of the jury system. Because the current evidence rules value
these principles more than the accuracy of the prejudice inquiry, they
prohibit jurors from testifying as to the actual effect the potentially
prejudicial information had on them.
From that background, this Note will argue that capital cases
warrant actual effect review and testimony from the jury about actual
effect. It will contend that because:
(1)the capital jury's task is a moral one and capital cases
require extra scrutiny because the stakes are so high;
(2) attorneys at evidentiary hearings often ask questions and
obtain evidence sufficient to measure actual effect;
(3) actual effect analysis avoids the practical aversions (of
extra hearings and dilatory tactics) courts usually have to
"subjective" tests;
(4) reviewing courts cannot fully isolate extraneous
information, especially when it is religious;
(5)reviewing courts always screen capital trials with
heightened scrutiny;'
4
(6) actual effect review reduces arbitrary sentences; AND
(7) ignoring the actual jury's testimony threatens judicial
legitimacy,
courts should employ an actual effect test when reviewing a death
sentence rendered when extrinsic information was before the jury.15
14 "The Court . .. has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other
punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination." California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
IS This article will not assess, among many other things, the merits of such a test in
non-capital sentencing, nor potential First Amendment Free Exercise Clause claims jurors may
have, nor Establishment Clause claims prisoners may have against jurors because they are "state
actors." For a thorough and insightful student note analyzing the Free Exercise Clause issue, see
Brian Galle, Note, Free Exercise Rights of Capital Jurors, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 569 (2001). For
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These favorable reasons might lead one to the conclusion that
religious sources should be permitted (i.e., not considered improper
"extrinsic" evidence). This Note does not argue that. As it mentions
later, this would lead to (among other things) problems of taxonomy
(i.e., what does and does not count as a religious source). As such,
this Note will not explore that possibility.
This may require a partial exception to Rule 606(b), but the
exception would be limited to the subset of capital cases where the
jury accesses extraneous information, and the purposes of the Rule
would be preserved. Further, because the independent moral
assessment requirement dictates that extraneous information used for
moral guidance may not have the avoidable detrimental effect on the
sentence one would expect in regular cases, courts should reject an
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice for extraneous information.
To expand this line of reasoning, Part I (A) will discuss briefly the
role of Christianity in the U.S. legal culture and its impact on capital
sentencing. Part I(B) will review relevant capital trial and sentencing
law, set by state and federal law and the Constitution. Rather than
offer an exhaustive account, it will instead emphasize the boundaries
of judicial control of jury discretion and decision making, and the
ways courts bend and shape traditional procedural and evidentiary
doctrines in capital cases. Part I(C) will further define the problem by
describing Robert Harlan's trial at some length.
Then, Part 1(A) will describe the actual effect test, and its benefits
and detriments. Part II(B) will describe two potential solutions to the
problem-carving out an exception from Rule 606(b) and
establishing an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice from extraneous
information in capital cases.
I. BACKGROUND
A heightened moral atmosphere pervades capital trials. In
America, Christianity often takes center stage. This section will seek
to explain the role of Christianity in U.S. legal culture, and how it
influences capital trials.
the view that the death penalty itself violates the Establishment Clause, see Gregory M. Ashley,
Note, Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as "Extraneous Material" in the
Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 VAND. L. REv. 127, 155 (2001).
[Vol. 57:4
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A. Christianity's Role in the Capital Jury Room
Christianity played a prominent role in the founding of America
and its legal system, from substance to procedure, to the ethics of the
profession.16 Almost all American criminal prohibitions derive from
religious prohibitions. 7 Contemporary combatants in the contentious
"church/state" dispute quarrel over how Christianity's influence
should be memorialized, not whether the influence exists.1 8 In spite of
this influence, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
requires a schism between religious influences and government
structure.' 9 While the Christian influence pervades the nation's early
legal history, so does respect for individual religious experiences and
limits on government religious favoritism. 20 The Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, the chief protectors of these
values, together do not envisage a freedom from religion, but instead
protect a freedom of religious exercise.2' Because of Christianity's
early and continuous influence, where government acts to
accommodate religious beliefs, it will most often have to do so for
Christians, since Christianity is the numerically predominant religion
in the United States.22
16 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); see
also Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1963) (discussing the
historical associations between Christianity and the government); Gordon J. Beggs, Challenges
in Judging: Some Insights From the Writings of Moses, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 145 (1996)
(noting that education of lawyers in the early period of the country's history in legal ethics was
largely based on the Bible, and that the first official canons of judicial ethics, written in the early
1900s, were based on Biblical precepts).
17 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring).
11 Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2894 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[Permissible
state-sanctioned displays of religion should show the] background from which the concept of
law emerged, ultimately having a secular influence in the history of the Nation. Government
may, of course, constitutionally call attention to this influence, and may post displays or erect
monuments recounting this aspect of our history no less than any other, so long as there is a
context and that context is historical."); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294 (Brennan, J., concurring)
("Specifically, I believe that the line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible [vis-A-vis the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses] is one which accords
with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.").
19 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (enshrining in the First Amendment the
idea from Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists that the Constitution erects a "'wall
of separation between Church and State" (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1879))).
20 U.S. CONsT., amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844,
860 (2005) ("When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of
advancing religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious
neutrality, there being no neutrality when the government's ostensible object is to take sides.")
(emphasis added).
21 Van Orden, 125 S.Ct. at 2860 n.3 (citing cases).
22 76.5%, according to a 2001 survey. Barry A. Kosmin & Seymour P. Lachman,
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However, the Due Process Clause guarantees a "fair trial in a fair
tribunal., 23  Religiously-grounded sentences seem intuitively to
violate this fairness requirement. 24 But, the Supreme Court of the
United States has not decided if religious references by courts are
unconstitutional.25 And, courts generally instruct jurors to make
credibility determinations in both civil and criminal trials based on
their life experiences and backgrounds, including their religious
upbringing.
26
Despite these potential limits, courts appear more tolerant of
religious references in capital cases. This may be because religion
plays such a prominent role.27 Courts give capital jurors much more
American Religious Identity Survey (2001), http://www.adherents.com/relUSA.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2006). However, the paradox can cut either of two ways: (1) we may see
Christianity as deserving of special protection and practical accommodation, since it will likely
be encountered most often, and had a factually significant role in the country's history, or (2) we
may see it as the biggest threat to religious freedom, since it is the religion that will likely tempt
government most strongly. When government accommodates Christianity, it is functionally
easier for the government's action to be reconciled with the history of our country than with
other religions, such as Zoroastrianism or Santeria.
23 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
24 However, juries sometimes acquit a defendant, even when the law compels a
conviction. Such jury nullification may flow from any reason (religious or not), or no reason at
all. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996)
(providing an excellent discussion of the subject, and an argument that courts and legislators
should abandon or rescind the many procedural protections thrown around the power of
nullification). Fears of nullification at the guilt phase of capital trials helped spur state
legislatures to largely avoid, and the Supreme Court of the United States to reject mandatory
death penalty statutes. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
25 Arnett v. Jackson 393 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Ihe Supreme Court has never
specifically decided whether a defendant's right to due process is violated if a religious text or
commentary is cited during a sentencing hearing .. "), reh'g en banc denied No. 03-4375,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6618 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2005). Claimants challenging religious references
usually cite United States v. Tucker's command that a sentencing judge who relies on
"erroneous information" violates due process. Id. (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443
(1972)).
26 See, e.g., COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 3:01 (1983) ("[Y]ou should
consider all the evidence in the light of your observations and experience in life."); OHIO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 405.20 (2005) ("To weigh the evidence, you must consider the credibility of
the witnesses (including the defendant). You will apply the tests of truthfulness which you apply
in your daily lives.").
27 For an exhaustive recitation of examples, see John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Don't Take His Eye, Don't Take His Tooth, and Don't Cast the First Stone: Limiting Religious
Arguments in Capital Cases, 9 WM. & MARY BELL RTS. J. 61, 62 (2000-2001); see also David
L. Hudson Jr., The Bible Tells them so: Making Biblical References at Trial May Be Grounds
for Reversal, 91 A.B.A.J. 14 (July 2005), for an example of one particular prosecutor who
frequently employed quotes from the Bible "to make a particular point." See also Killer of Girl,
11, Sentenced to Die, CH. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2006, at 7. (quoting the defendant as testifying during
the mitigation phase "Every day I think about what I did and beg God for forgiveness."); State
v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594, 609 (N.C. 2003) ("Considering the atrocity of the present murder
and the few defense strategies available to defendant in his closing argument, it seems
reasonable for the prosecution to anticipate that defendant might offer religious sentiment
during his closing argument."), The Haselden court also cited State v. Bond, 478 S.E.2d 163,
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discretion than their non-capital criminal and civil counterparts. Death
penalty jurors must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances
to decide if the defendant lives or dies, and this choice is a moral
one.28 Thus, courts in some locations permit the jury to pray and
discuss religious matters during deliberation. 29 Though this might
seem surprising, courts (and the drafters of evidence rules) worry
more about limiting discussions of "case-specific" facts that are not in
the record than discussion of more general information each juror has
learned from their life experiences. 30 Though the jury's capital
sentencing decision is both individual (unanimity requirements for
mitigators are unconstitutional), 31 and moral, some courts forbid the
jury from using religion in weighing aggravators and mitigators and
look with disfavor on the injection of religion into the trial.32
This Note will not judge the wisdom of granting this much power
to capital juries.33 In weighing aggravators and mitigators, religion is
as legitimate for a juror to use as any other system of thought. As a
practical matter, American jurors will likely reference Christian
teachings more than any other religion for help.
With that said, this Note is not meant as a paean to Christianity or
an assertion of or argument for its political or theological supremacy.
Instead, the above historical information, and the discussion to come
highlight what in American capital trials will be a very common
iteration of the extraneous information problem. In capital cases, the
independent moral assessment requirement and frequent references to
182 (1996) (noting that prosecutors should generally anticipate religiously grounded mitigation
arguments from the defense), and State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304, 326 (1983) (same).
28 See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990); supra note 4.
29 See, e.g., Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20, 48-49 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Bieghler
v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 203 (Ind. 1997) ("We do not find it surprising that 'conscientious
people who are faced with a life and death decision resort to their religious scruples in reaching
such a decision. Such deep introspection neither violates principles of justice nor prejudices the
defendant.'"); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1308-09 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (upholding jury's
verdict where evidence showed jurors prayed together during deliberations).
30 As this Note points out below, many jury instructions ask the jury to think about the
evidence and discuss it in light of their own experiences.
31 McKoy, 494 U.S. at 435 ("North Carolina's unanimity requirement violates the
Constitution by preventing the sentencer from considering all mitigating evidence.").
32 See, e.g., Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (vacating a capital
sentence when the jury was specifically authorized by the trial judge to use the Bible at
sentencing); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630 (Pa. 1991) (vacating a capital sentence
when the prosecutor made religious references during closing argument, and banning all
religious discussion at trial); cf. State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594, 617 (N.C. 2003) (noting that
reversible error has not occurred when a prosecutor anticipates that the defense will use Biblical
references about capital punishment being "contrary to Christian ethics," and offers
counterarguments).
33 For an exposition of this view, see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 308-324
(1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ashley, supra note 15, at 136-38.
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religion produce moral inquisitiveness from the jury. That
inquisitiveness may inspire the jury to consult extraneous evidence.
Many will look to the Bible.
The arguments in this Note, however, can apply to any instance of
extraneous information. This Note's thesis is strongest when the jury
uses extraneous evidence for moral guidance, based on the following
logic.
First, I will define "prejudice" from extraneous evidence as a
negative impact on the defendant that would not have occurred in that
evidence's absence. Second, assume that the jury consults extraneous
evidence. That evidence has some innate tendency to cause prejudice.
That tendency can be mapped along a spectrum of prejudice.
Evidence regarding the "case-specific" facts (e.g., a newspaper
report controverting defendant's proffered "child abuse" mitigating
evidence) is at the "high-prejudice" end. At the opposite end is
evidence most likely to be used purely for the moral response of
weighing evidence (e.g., a Bible verse telling jurors not to kill). This
evidence poses a reduced threat of prejudice because a juror could
permissibly have possessed this information as part of their suite of
background experience, and used it in their personal moral response,
so long as it is not in tangible form. "Case-specific" evidence
regarding the dry facts of the case is at the opposite, "high-prejudice"
end.
The closer that a piece of extrinsic evidence is to the
"low-prejudice" end, the more this Note's arguments apply to it. The
judge might ask the juror, "did this piece of extraneous information
change your mind about the sentence?" If the source provides mostly
moral guidance, the juror is more likely to be able to give an earnest
"no" reply-she could have come to the same conclusion, and
permissibly so, by reading the extraneous passage on her own, or by
remembering it from her Sunday School days. 34
Thus, one solution would be to simply admit moral guidance
information as evidence relevant to sentencing. However, this Note
does not conclude from the above reasoning that this makes "moral"
information in any sense not "extraneous," nor automatically proper.
Attempting to classify a source as moral or not moral would
compound the difficulties courts have in determining what moral
inference a juror would draw from extraneous information with
primarily moral content.35 Guarantees of judicial religious neutrality
34 See Harlan 11, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005).
35 It might also create Constitutional havoc if one attempts to decide what sources can
[Vol. 57:4
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might guarantee open-ended admission of evidence jurors claim helps
them. These interpretive difficulties also increase the more "moral"
the source is; another reason why this Note's arguments strengthen in
proportion to the moral content of the source.
As discussed above, a religious ethos animates capital trials. The
arguments are more spirited and more emotionally charged, because
the final stakes are so high, and the offense charged so severe.
Reflecting this difference from the criminal norm, the Eighth
Amendment and other Constitutional prerogatives force courts to
depart from the usual procedural model used in a criminal case, as the
next section will discuss.
B. Relevant Capital Law and Procedure
As noted above, even capital jurors do not enjoy carte blanche
power to impose their philosophy, Christian or other, on defendants.36
Courts exercise quality control over jury decisions at several points.37
At each, courts attempt to prevent erroneous or arbitrary capital
sentences. This judicial scrutiny is one trade-off made for the wide
latitude the Constitution guarantees to capital jurors. The judiciary
also guards that latitude with a nearly flat prohibition of post-trial
inquiry into deliberations. 38 Capital and non-capital proceedings differ
in many substantial respects, including jury selection, judicial review,
and evidentiary standards. Death's "difference," both as a punishment
and in the procedure used to mete it out is a common thread woven
potentially be moral or not (someone might argue that Gray's Medical Dictionary or a
microwave instruction manual should count).
36 The trial judge may give a death sentence even if the jury recommends life in only five
states: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Montana, and Nebraska. Only in Nebraska do judges
actually determine the sentence free of any jury input about its suitability; a three-judge panel
has the option of imposing death if the jury unanimously decides on aggravating factors. The
Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Information, www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state
(last accessed Feb. 7, 2006). The Supreme Court has held that judges can make this decision-
the Constitution does not give defendants a right to a jury determination of life or death.
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 738 (1990). Thus, this Note will focus instead on the role
capital jurors play, which the Constitution guarantees will be substantial, even in the above
states. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, (2002) (requiring aggravating circumstances to be found
by the jury, and discussing the jury's role in capital sentencing generally). However, in the event
that a particular state vested the judge with the sort of moral discretion jurors have, this Note's
arguments would apply equally to the judge.
37 State systems for quality control may differ but still be constitutional. The day that the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), approving
Georgia's capital punishment scheme, it also approved Florida's scheme, Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242 (1976), and Texas's scheme, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), even though the
three systems take very different approaches to (for example) aggravating and mitigating factor
instructions.
38 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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throughout the following description.39 States choose the specifics of
their death penalty system. However, the Supreme Court of the
United States has set many baseline limitations to prevent arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty and ensure individualized
sentencing. 4° Voir dire, restrictions on aggravators, liberal mitigating
evidence standards, and automatic judicial review are just some of the
features of death penalty trials and sentencing that differentiate capital
trials from criminal trials.
1. Capital Voir Dire
Voir dire is the process of questioning and seating jurors for a trial
or capital sentencing.41 Capital voir dire differs from non-capital voir
dire because the Constitution guarantees defendants a right to ask
39 The Supreme Court of the United States frequently sounds this refrain, that "death is
different," when justifying departures from standard criminal procedure in capital trials. See,
e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 363 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (5-4 decision)
(contending that the rule in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that a jury, not the judge must
find all aggravators, should be applied retroactively); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion)
(Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
40 The Supreme Court of the United States applies the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments in setting substantive and procedural limitations, respectively, on the imposition of
the death penalty. For instance, the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment" sets limits on the age of the defendant, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005);
the mens rea of the defendant and type of crime, Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison
v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); and the mental
capacity of the defendant, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (forbidding the death penalty
for the mentally retarded); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (forbidding the death
penalty for those incompetent at the time of execution). See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that capital punishment per se violates the Eighth
Amendment precisely because death penalty statutes nationwide could not solve these
difficulties); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (reaffirming earlier precedent and
holding that the death penalty must not be imposed arbitrarily); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that North Carolina's mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional
because it prevented individualized sentencing).
41 Though the process of voir dire itself is not constitutionally guaranteed, it plays a
"critical function" in guaranteeing defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a fair and
impartial jury. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981). The State and the
Defendant can limit the jury pool in two ways. First, they can employ "for cause" challenges,
where the party offers the judge a particular reason (usually statutory) for removing the juror.
Typically these include lack of qualification, previous service on a related matter or offense,
personal relation to a participant in the case, or prejudiced state of mind. WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3 at 1054-55 (4th Ed. 2004).
The judge retains discretion over whether to remove. Or, second, they can remove a juror by
using a limited number of "peremptory challenges," where little or no rationale need be offered
and the attorney's power to remove remains essentially plenary. An attorney cannot use
peremptories to remove jurors because of race, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), or
gender, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), and the judge may require a party
to give a neutral reason for a peremptory if it appears they are using peremptories in a
discriminatory manner.
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certain questions about each juror's willingness to impose death.42 It
requires courts to remove jurors who would never vote for the death
penalty, and those who would always vote for the death penalty.43
The Supreme Court articulated the current constitutional for-cause
exclusion standard in capital trials in Wainwright v. Witt.44 Witt held
that the court should excuse a capital juror for cause if that juror's
beliefs will "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath., 45
Voir dire buttresses the constitutional rights of defendants. In close
cases, or where potential prejudice from a particular extraneous
source is at issue, reviewing courts may see voir dire quality as one
indicator of prejudice. The additional procedural protections that gird
capital voir dire should engender additional trust from reviewing
courts. Yet, courts fear arbitrary jury sentences in capital cases.46 As
discussed below, they attempt to give rigorous instructions both at the
guilt and sentencing phases to "channel" the jury's discretion.
42 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) (holding that the state's removal
from the jury pool of all members with "conscientious or religious scruples against capital
punishment" was improper because it produced a jury "uncommonly willing to condemn a man
to die"). The petitioner in Witherspoon also advanced the argument that there was an empirical
connection between those who favor the death penalty and conviction, but the court deemed it
too uncertain. Id. at 517. For experimental evidence to show that this is true, see James
Luginbuhl & Kathi Middendorf, Death Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to Aggravating
and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 263, 264 (1988). For
other cases highlighting the rights of defendants to question prospective jurors, see Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (allowing defendants to ask the "reverse-Witherspoon" question-
whether the juror would automatically vote for death); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986)
(allowing the defendant, upon request, to ask jurors whether the racial alignment of the victim
and the defendant will prejudice their decision), disapproved on other grounds by O'Dell v.
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997).
43 See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (articulating the standard for when a juror
may be removed for cause to the juror's views on capital punishment).
44 Id. For a nice description of how the exclusion standard evolved over time, see Ronald
C. Dillehay & Maria R. Sandys, Life under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror Dispositions and Death
Qualification, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 147-48 (1996).
45 Witt, 469 U.S. at 420 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980)). Some
commentators argue, however, that Win exclusion biases the jury in favor of conviction and a
death sentence, and there is some evidence to confirm this. For the view that this is a weakness
of Witt, because jurors cannot accurately project themselves into the future to know whether
they'll be able to discharge their duty, see Dillehay & Sandys, supra note 44, at 148; Mike
Allen, Edward Mabry, & Drue-Marie McKelton, Impact of Juror Attitudes about the Death
Penalty on Juror Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 715, 716 (1998) ("Thus, asking prospective jurors to consider hypothetically a guilty
verdict forms a category of experience about the trial that labels the defendant guilty even
before the trial begins. The consequence is to poison the well (juror's mind) as a precondition of
jury service.").
4 Arbitrariness doomed the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, where Justice Potter
Stewart famously likened it to being "struck by lightning." 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
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2. Capital Sentencing
Once the jury is impaneled, it remains a passive participant in the
trial until both sides have rested. The judge then instructs the jury,
and the jury departs to determine the verdict.
As noted above, states are generally free to fashion the specifics of
their capital regime. Colorado's approach is typical of most states. In
Colorado,47 the road to a death sentence begins when the prosecution
decides to seek the death penalty. First, during the "guilt phase" of the
trial, a unanimous jury must find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
After this, the sentencing phase begins. The sentencing proceeding
is like a trial unto itself. Both sides put on evidence and make opening
and closing statements.48 Once the sentencing proceeding concludes,
the jury departs to deliberate. 49 For the defendant to then be
"death-eligible," the jury must find specifically that the defense
proved no "special" mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt 5° and that
the prosecution proved at least one aggravating factor unanimously
beyond a reasonable doubt.51 Then, each juror independently decides
whether any other mitigating factors exist. 52  Juries must find
aggravators and mitigators based on evidence from the hearing.
However, courts must take a very lenient view of admissibility in
47 This Note (and this section) will use the specific example of Colorado because the
exemplary case (Harlan, infra) hails from that jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions may not have a
jury instruction that mirrors the "independent moral assessment" instruction for weighing.
However, there is ample suggestion from Supreme Court jurisprudence suggesting that states
should tell their jurors to make such an assessment, if not in so many words. See supra note 4.
Granted, the Court may not be issuing a normative command to the states. If not, they have still
tacitly sanctioned this role for the jury in capital cases.
48 RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 447 (2d. Ed. 2001).
49 What happens next may vary. Some states, such as Colorado, have a list of special
mitigators that, if proved, prevent the imposition of death.
50 COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL, § 38:09, I(a)-(e) (2005).
51 This is true in almost all states, either as a liability question (an element of the actual
offense) or as a sentencing question. Galle, supra note 15, at 590.
52 Some states prescribe specific mitigating factors. But the Constitution requires that
jurors be able to give effect to any potential mitigating factor they can find from the evidence
presented. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987) (reversing death sentence
where advisory jury was instructed not to consider, and sentencing judge refused to consider,
any mitigating factor outside of those enumerated in the sentencing statute). Jurors also can
consider a defendant's unsworn statement of allocution. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S.
301, 304-05 (1961) (recognizing the right of a defendant to speak on his or her own behalf).
The right to allocute is recognized in most jurisdictions by court rule or statute, or in the state
constitution. Its form and judicial control vary according to jurisdiction; some restrict the
allocution to statements of historical fact, others allow outright pleas for mercy. LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 41, at 1246-47.
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sentencing proceedings.53 Blurring standard evidence rules, courts
must admit any mitigating evidence the defendant offers, as part of
the Constitutional requirement of individualized capital sentencing.54
Indeed, the Constitution only requires the jury to consider proffered
mitigating evidence, not to decide that it mitigates the defendant's
blame.55
If the jury decides unanimously that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors56 beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court
sentences the defendant to die.57 The court can override a death
sentence if the jury's decision has been influenced by "passion,
53 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (noting that the best system is one
where the sentencing authority is given the necessary information and guidance on how to use
this information); PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS §
15.2502F.1 (2005).
54 Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
113-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978). The one potential exception is
evidence of jurors' "residual doubt" about the defendant's guilt. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted that the proposition that the Eighth Amendment protects the right to introduce
residual doubt evidence is "quite doubtful." See, e.g., Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S.Ct. 1226,
1231-32 (2006) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173 n. 6 (1988)). However, they
have never had to explicitly hold that the right exists.
55 McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990) ("The Constitution requires States
to allow consideration of mitigating evidence in capital cases."); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ([C]apital cases... [require] consideration of the character and record
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."); Lockett, 438 U.S. at
604-05 ("[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer,
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."); Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) ("Just as the state may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider,
as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence."); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368
(1993) ("As long as the mitigating evidence is within 'the effective reach of the sentencer,' the
requirements of the Eighth Amendment are satisfied.") (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S.
461 (1993).
56 See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2524 (2006) (holding that the Constitution
permits states to put the risk of non-persuasion on the defendant).
57 On this, death penalty states fall into two categories: "weighing" and "non-weighing."
The term is really a misnomer. The "non-weighing" states draw less of a distinction between the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The jury is charged to view the entire set of the
defendant's circumstances, rather than viewing aggravators and mitigators qua aggravators and
mitigators. Metaphorically, the process is more like a bathroom scale than the scales of justice.
The latter exemplifies "weighing" states. In those states, (Colorado is one), the jury finds
aggravators and mitigators separately and tries to balance them. However, the distinction lacks
any real probative force. For one, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently
abandoned the distinction, at least when determining whether they must vacate a defendant's
sentence because the defendant's jury considered an invalid aggravating factor. Brown v.
Sanders, 126 S.Ct. 884 (2006). Relevant to this Note, both require the juror to make a moral
judgment about propriety of the death penalty for the defendant before them, based on the
legally cognizable aggravators and mitigators.
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prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor," or if it is "clearly erroneous
as contrary to the weight of the evidence."
5 8
This scheme, while perfectly constitutional, does not tell jurors
how to weigh the factors.59 It might be a Constitutional requirement
for the scheme not to tell jurors how to do this. Indeed, Colorado and
other states' jury instructions offer similarly little guidance. 6° In
run-of-the-mill criminal cases, jurors are instructed to view all the
evidence against the backdrop of their own experiences.
In capital cases, the jurors must take recourse to their beliefs more
than the typical juror.6' They must look within themselves (and,
essentially, outside the evidence, which is the source of the factors
they must consider) when they weigh aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and make their independent moral assessment. For
many, this will involve Christian beliefs.62
The independent moral assessment requirement is part of a morass
of prerequisites imposed by the Constitution before the state can
execute defendants. Courts tightly channel the jury's discretion during
the guilt phase of a trial, to prevent arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty.63 Yet, jurors must give each defendant an "individualized
sentence." Individualized sentences are by nature arbitrary. 64
58 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(c) (2006); Harlan 11, 109 P.3d 616, 630 (Colo.
2005) (citing People v. Dunlap 975 P.2d 723, 736 (Colo. 1999)). Colorado's four-step
sentencing process is outlined in COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(2)(a)-(b) (2006). In some
jurisdictions, separate jurors are used for the liability phase and the penalty phase of the trial.
59 The Constitution does not prescribe a specific method for weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
60 See, e.g., COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 3:01 (1983) (expressing the
"independent moral assessment" idea); CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 8.88
(2005) ("You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to
each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider."); 4 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL § 503.011(12) (2005) ("You shall then decide whether the State of Ohio proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance(s) outweigh(s) the mitigating
factors present in this case. It is the quality of the evidence regarding aggravating
circumstance(s) and mitigating factors that must be given primary consideration by you.").
61 Zant, 462 U.S. at 875 (1983); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-74 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting and describing the paradox),
overruled on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
62 Kosmin & Lachman, supra note 22.
63 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Mandatory imposition of death, of course,
prevents arbitrary imposition of death. But mandatory imposition is likewise unconstitutional.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
64 For a discussion of this tension, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) overruled in part, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. AND MARY BILL RTS. J.
345 (1998); Vivian Berger, Colloquy, "Black Box Decisions" on iDfe or Death-If They're
Arbitrary, Don't Blame the Jury: A Reply to Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1067 (1991).
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Attempting to draw a line between religion and secular moral
philosophy, the Supreme Court has previously stated, "[i]t is of vital
importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision
to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason
rather than caprice or emotion." 65  Yet, the independent moral
assessment charge requires the decision to be made on the basis of
emotion. Each defendant's fate turns on the unpredictable moral
assessments of the jury. The only way to prevent a sentence that will
be "arbitrary," in this sense, is to provide an objective foundation.
Abolishing the independent moral assessment would thus require
states to come up with a "point system" for balancing aggravating and
66mitigating circumstances. A point system, though, is the opposite of
a "moral" response, as states often explain to their juries.67 The
Supreme Court of the United States initially voiced some skepticism
about whether states could satisfactorily legislate aggravators,
mitigators, and how the two interact.68 It soon thereafter retreated
from its skepticism,69 holding that states can adequately channel jury
discretion by spelling out statutory aggravating circumstances and
requiring them to be found beyond a reasonable doubt.7°
But, creating a balancing system may violate the "individualized
sentencing" requirement of Woodson v. North Carolina. Woodson
required the scale to be recalibrated with each defendant. The
65 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
66 The other solution, mandatory death sentences for certain crimes, is unconstitutional.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
67 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 8.88 (2005) ("The weighing of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors
on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You
are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of
the various factors you are permitted to consider."). However, the instructions on "ties" between
aggravators and mitigators belie the idea that the judgment is totally qualitative. See, e.g., 4
OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL § 503.011(14) (2005) ("EQUAL WEIGHT. If the weight
of the aggravating circumstance(s) and mitigating factors are equal then you must proceed to
consider the life sentence alternatives."). States are allowed to require the defendant to prove
that the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence; thus, state statutes that tell the
jury to impose death when the aggravators and mitigators are in equipoise are constitutional.
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2523 (2006). In Marsh, the Court held that a jury finding that
aggravators and mitigators are in equipoise does not reflect confusion or indecision, but simply
is "indicative of the type of measured, normative process in which a jury is constitutionally
tasked to engage when deciding the appropriate sentence for a capital defendant." Id. at 2528.
68 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). In McGautha, the court concluded that
unfettered jury discretion did not offend the Constitution. Viewing the same boundless power a
year later in Furman v. Georgia, the court famously reached the opposite conclusion-that the
U.S. capital punishment system as a whole had to fall. 408 U.S. 231 (1972).
69 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
70 However, jurors can still treat as mitigating or non-mitigating any proffered evidence.
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question, then, is whether this is wise. And the answer depends upon
our concept of the jury system. If the jury is the answer to
government oppression (as originally conceived), then we must allow
its members to speak with their conscience and the conscience of the
community when making perhaps the weightiest civic decision
assigned to private citizens. Under this view, the wide discretion
granted jurors allows death penalty penology to match up with the
morality of the community in a way that insulated judges cannot as
effectively guarantee.71 If one instead conceives the jury as an
instrument of majoritarian whim and the passions of the mob, then
one will want to tie its hands further.
Because the first view seems to be the dominant one, especially in
light of Woodson and related cases vesting the jury with the ability to
give mercy for reasons too intangible to be put into statute, any calls
for abolishing the moral response requirement likely will go
unanswered. So, the jurors each search their feelings and morals, and
if all agree that the defendant should be executed, the order is given.
The jury's sentence is nowhere near final once handed down. In
many states, the death sentence is automatically reviewed by an
appellate court. Automatic independent review is a hallmark of
constitutionally valid death penalty systems.72 Reviewing courts
typically employ a de novo standard of review.73 However, they
follow a strong presumption that jurors are able to listen to evidence,
sort through it, and reach a decision.74 In Colorado, the courts review
a death sentence to ensure that it is: (1) appropriate under the
circumstances; and (2) not imposed arbitrarily or under the influence
of passion, prejudice, or some arbitrary factor.
71 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104-05 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that a
sanction of denaturalization as punishment for desertion should be the domain of a civilian court
(i.e. jury) and not the military tribunals).
72 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 ("The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-
sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty.").
73 E.g., People v. Dunlap 975 P.2d 723, 736-37, 765 (Colo. 1999). This differs
substantially from typical appellate review of a judge's criminal sentence. Appellate courts can
vacate a sentence if the judge's sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
261 (2005) (holding that, though appellate review provision of the Sentencing Guidelines is
unconstitutional, the statute, in other provisions, sets forth an implicit reasonableness standard).
74 See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 975-77 (1994) (upholding a statutory
aggravator because the factor had a "common-sense core" that courts could presume jurors
understand); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) ("The assessment of prejudice
should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and
impartially applying the standards that govern the decision."); United States v. Lomeli, 76 F.3d
146, 149 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e must presume that juries are capable of both sorting through the
evidence and following a court's instructions.").
75 Harlan 11, 109 P.3d 616, 630 (Colo. 2005) (citing Dunlap, 975 P.2d at 736).
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Voir dire, liberal evidentiary standards (where they benefit
defendants), and automatic judicial review are just some of the major
checks on the jury, designed to prevent arbitrary decisions. Different
jurisdictions weigh their importance in varying and sometimes
contradictory ways. Favorably reviewed voir dire and instructions
will defuse allegations of other misconduct. But courts will only
scrutinize jury decision-making to a limited degree. They truncate the
parties' ability to ask jurors about deliberations to a few limited
circumstances.7 6 Even when courts grant access to the jury, they limit
the admissibility of the testimony jurors give.
3. Rule of Evidence 606(b) and Extraneous Information
Though the court further regulates jury decision-making after the
jury reaches a verdict and sentence, Rule 606(b) limits the evidence
the court can use to reduce the sentence on the basis of juror
misconduct:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection
therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to
the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether
there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict
form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the
juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifying.77
This rule prohibits jurors from testifying about the substance of their
deliberations, and prevents the court from admitting even their
76 See FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
77 Id. For an excellent discussion of the legislative tumult that culminated in the passage
of Rule 606(b), see MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, § 245. Rule 606(b) as it appears
here was amended in 2006, but this amendment does not affect the analysis in this Note. For
brief acknowledgment and comment on this, see Comments of Federal Magistrate Judges
Association Rules Committee on Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Criminal Procedure, and Evidence, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2.
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voluntary testimony on such matters. 78 Rule 606(b) applies to jury
sentencing, including capital proceedings.79
The rule applies even where one side alleges juror misconduct. It
limits testimony about the effect of extraneous information to
specifics about the information. 80 The purpose of Rule 606(b) is to
promote finality of the jury's decision and protect the jurors from
harassment. 81 The courts have weighed these principles against
potential harm to defendants wrought by a poisoned jury. In balancing
the two, the Supreme Court of the United States sides with the Rule
and not the defendant, save for cases of the plainest injustice.82
Though juror testimony as to actual effect has all the veracity of any
other testimony, truth-seeking is not always the sole purpose of
evidentiary rules. There are tradeoffs involved. Here, the Rules trade
accuracy for finality, harassment prevention, and the legal fiction that
the jury is perfect, though any commentator will concede that
shenanigans probably transpire in every deliberation.83
Rule 606(b)'s principle was generated by Lord Mansfield, and was
based on the moral principle nemo turpitudinem suam allegans
audietur ("no one shall be heard to allege his own turpitude").
Mansfield applied this maxim in a 1785 case where the jurors illicitly
reached their verdict by casting lots. 84 The principle eventually
trickled across the Atlantic, and into the American reporters. Though
the maxim had no basis in American legal precedent, and has been
repudiated in other areas of evidence law,85 it became virtually
sacrosanct, 86 and Rule 606(b) retains it to this day.
Some exceptions gradually emerged, however, and they remain as
common-law baggage to the current version of the Rule. Attorneys
78 Courts have even drawn a distinction between a juror testifying that they are not guilty
of misconduct, and attempting to impeach their own verdict by that misconduct. 75B AM. JUR.
2D Trial § 1901 (1992 & Supp. 2006) (collecting cases). Even the most liberal courts that have
adopted Rule 606(b) permit testimony as to the deliberative process only to prove "objective
facts." Id. at 632 n.3.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 245 (5th Cir. 1998).
80 Harlan //, 109 P.3d 616, 626 (Colo. 2005) (describing the factors that can be
considered).
81 Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo. 2002).
8 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-69 (1915).
83 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 247 (citing Sims' Crane Serv., Inc. v.
Ideal Steel Prods. Inc., 800 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
8 See Vaise v. Delaval, (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B.).
85 People v. Hutchinson, 455 P.2d 132, 135 (Cal. 1969) (adopting a liberal view of the
rule, but still permitting only evidence of objective facts to impeach a verdict).
8 For an excellent discussion of the remaining historical journey from Mansfield to the
modem-day Rule 606(B), see Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110
YALE L. J. 1493, 1501-04 (2001) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN THE COMMON LAW § 2352 (3d ed. 1940)).
(Vol. 57:4
THE GIDEONS AND THE GALLOWS
may examine, for instance, whether the jury saw extraneous evidence
during the deliberations, or whether jurors coerced each other such
that their verdicts were "not their own.,, 87 They do so in an
evidentiary hearing after one side makes a minimal demonstration
that the jury might have had access to extraneous information.
However, in both cases, the hearing authorized is a limited one, and
must stop short of any probing into the substance of the jurors'
deliberations.88 Courts stop probing potential juror misconduct at the
first hint that a juror was not acting improperly. 89 Further, the
sentence cannot be disturbed, even when one side shows that a juror
misunderstood the instructions. If that juror's verdict "was his own,"
it will stand.90 If the hearing proves that the information posed a
reasonable likelihood of prejudice to the defendant in the mind of a
typical juror, the court will order a new trial.91
Rule 606 is silent on several key matters. It presumes that
44 92extrinsic" evidence is improper. And, it leaves open the question of
the consequence of extrinsic evidence being before the jury. It does
not prescribe a method for courts to determine prejudice to the
defendant. Nor does it dictate a particular result if the court finds
prejudice. Common law rules fill these doctrinal gaps.
Evidence not admitted into the record is deemed "extraneous." In
the early days of the jury system, the jury was expected to be a "self-
informing" body, and was "supposed to have sufficient knowledge to
try a case in which no evidence on either side was produced in
court., 93 But increasing commercial and industrial development
dispersed the small, stable communities where everyone knew
everyone else.94 Jurors often found that they lacked first-hand
87 People v. Rudnick, 878 P.2d 16, 21-22 (Colo. Ct. App.1993). But see Ravin v.
Gambrell, 788 P.2d 817, 821 (Colo. 1990) ("However important these concepts are, in cases
where the result of jury deliberations has been substantially undermined because of fundamental
flaws in the deliberative process itself, courts must weigh the force of these policies against the
overriding concern that parties to the judicial process be assured of a fair result.").
88 Rudnick, 878 P.2d at 21-22.
89 Cf People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing trial court's finding
of contempt against a juror for withholding information in voir dire, on grounds that the trial
court impermissibly considered evidence regarding jury deliberations).
90 People v. Thornton, 712 P.2d 1095, 1100 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 716 P.2d 1115 (Colo. 1986).
91 Karen Abbott, Verdict's in on Juries That Run Their Own Way, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Apr. 15, 2005, at 26A (collecting prominent examples of new trials ordered for the
presence of extraneous material).
9 In fact, the Federal Rules of Evidence never expressly proscribe a jurors' use of
extrinsic information.
93 John D. Jackson, Making Juries Accountable, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 477, 491 (2002)
(quoting Bushel's Case, 124 E.R. 1006, 1012 (1671)).
94 Edward L. Rubin, Trial By Battle. Trial By Argument., 56 ARK. L. REv. 261, 275
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knowledge of the case and the ability to efficiently get it. Courts
needed to prevent the jury from investigating on their own. But it
would have been impractical to force the parties to educate the jurors
about elementary suppositions not specific to the case at hand (water
runs downhill, the sun rises in the east, etc.). As such, courts seek
mostly to limit "case-specific" facts or opinions not admitted into
evidence from being before the jury, rather than background facts or
principles courts presume jurors know.
As for the prejudice determination, because Rule 606(b) prohibits
juror testimony about actual effects, courts use a typical juror test to
determine prejudice. Exposure to extraneous material does not always
require a new trial, though extraneous material is usually viewed as
presumptively prejudicial. 95 Once this presumption arises, the State
bears the burden of rebutting the presumption by showing that the
consideration of the evidence was harmless to the defendant.96 In
capital cases, courts that find prejudice to a defendant during the
sentencing deliberations will usually reduce the sentence to life
imprisonment. But, both the typical juror and "sentence reduction"
decisions are common-law concepts that must be made (and can
therefore be changed) by common-law courts.
Several recent cases have applied these principles to Biblical
extraneous material. In difficult moral decisions like sentencing, one
might expect the sentencer to refer to personal moral frameworks.
The most likely sort of extraneous information and the sort most
likely to muddy the legal waters are religious materials. Though the
next section will primarily restrict its discussion to religious
examples, the principles discussed apply to any extraneous
information in capital cases. As noted above, this Note does not argue
that religious or moral sources are in any way not "extrinsic," not
"extraneous," or presumptively proper.
(2003) (citing ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 950-
1350 (1976)).
95 McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1307-1308 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("[A]ny evidence that
does not 'come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial
protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel' is
presumptively prejudicial." (quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-473 (U.S. 1965));
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). But see United States v. Williams-Davis, 90
F.3d 490, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that Remmer applies only to private contacts with the
jury, and not merely to exposure to information itself, such as a newspaper report). For a
description of how extraneous material is handled in Virginia, see Terence T. Egland, Note,
Prejudiced by the Presence of God: Keeping Religious Material Out of Death Penalty
Deliberations, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 337, 342-46 (2004).
96 Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S 227, 229 (1954).
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C. The Problem-People v. Harlan
Robert Eliot Harlan faced the death penalty for the murder,
kidnapping, and rape of casino worker Roberta Maloney and a
crippling assault on Maloney's would-be rescuer Jacquie Creazzo.
The jury sentenced Harlan to die. The Colorado Supreme Court
upheld the sentence.97 First, the high court made sure that Harlan was
the sort of criminal for whom the death penalty was appropriate. 9
The death penalty had to be appropriate "having regard to the nature
of the offense, the character and record of the offender, the public
interest, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed." 99
Second, the court had to verify that the jury did not impose the death
penalty "under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other
arbitrary factor."
In Harlan I, the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the death
penalty was appropriate because Harlan's crime was "exceptionally
brutal" and because the state proved three statutory aggravating
factors, which were not sufficiently mitigated by the factors (his
remorse and lack of prior criminal record, e.g.) offered in his
defense.)° The court further decided, despite some reservations, that
the trial was a fundamentally fair proceeding.'10 Moving to the second
portion of the inquiry, the Harlan I court was primarily concerned
with racial bias, which it deemed did not undermine the fundamental
fairness of the trial because it was adequately handled in voir dire and
with rigorous jury instructions. 0 2
91 Justice Alex J. Martinez wrote the opinion for a unanimous court. Justice Nathan
Bender did not participate.
98 The Harlan H court found the jury's death sentence appropriate. 109 P.3d 616, 619
(Colo. 2005).
99 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1201(6)(a) (2004).
IODFormerly COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(5)(d), (g), (j), relocated to COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-1201(5)(d), (g), (j) (2006). The trial court also noted in mitigation, somewhat
incredibly, that Harlan posed no significant threat of violence to others if sentenced to life
imprisonment. See Harlan 1, 8 P.3d at 495.
101 Harlan 1, 8 P.3d at 498-99.
102 The Supreme Court of the United States, in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986), has
held that, in interracial capital cases, the defendant is entitled to have the jurors apprised of the
race of the victim and to be able to question the jurors to root out potential racial bias. Notably,
the Colorado Supreme Court in 2000 closed its validation of Harlan's death sentence by noting
that Harlan's facts were equal if not more gruesome than cases where it had deemed death
appropriate. Harlan 1, 8 P.3d at 501. ("[Ihe defendant raped, kidnapped, assaulted, and killed
his victim in an especially brutal way. These facts ... substantially parallel prior cases in which
we have found a death sentence to be appropriate.") Thus, Harlan I allowed the first part of its
inquiry, the appropriateness test, to influence the second part of its inquiry, the arbitrariness test.
Because the facts of the case were commensurate with other death penalty cases, the Colorado
Supreme Court found a decreased likelihood of actual prejudice and so it upheld the sentence.
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After the jury rendered its verdict and sentence, a defense
investigator discovered that one of the jurors brought a Bible into the
sentencing deliberations. The juror had taken notes on several
passages, and read those passages aloud. The passages chosen and
read in the jury room seemed, in the trial court's view, to command
the death penalty for murderers. Those passages were: (1) Leviticus
24:20-21-"Fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, as he
has caused disfigurement of a man, so shall it be done to him. And
whoever kills an animal shall restore it, but whoever kills a man shall
be put to death." (2) Romans 13: 1-"Let every soul be subject to the
governing authorities for there is no authority except from God and
the authorities that exist are appointed by God.'
0 3
The jury had been sequestered, and ordered not to watch television
or read the paper. The jurors were admonished not to venture outside
to collect extra factual materials, and the court emphasized that the
jury's freedoms would be restricted so that it could focus on the case
at hand. °4
But no one thought to remove the ubiquitous Gideon's Bible from
their hotel rooms.
10 5
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing after finding that the
defense sufficiently established that the jury might have used
extraneous information.106 It reduced Harlan's sentence to life
imprisonment, after trying to isolate the passages the jury read, and
deciding that there was a "reasonable possibility" that the Biblical
passages the trial court thought the jury read "would have influenced
a typical juror to reject a life sentence for Harlan. 10 7
The Colorado Supreme Court again reviewed the trial court's
determination. This time, it affirmed the trial court's decision to
103 The majority thought that the Romans passage meant jurors were required to impose the
death penalty. Justice Rice, in her dissent, notes that this passage simply means that individuals
are to follow the governing law of their state, i.e., the four-step process laid out in Dunlap. The
only way the majority's reading makes sense is if they supposed the jury thought the passage in
Leviticus (which does seem to require the death penalty) was a substitute for the death penalty
law in Colorado.
10°Harlan If, 109 P.3d 616, 621 (Colo. 2005).105 The judge had placed all of the jurors under a strict gag order, in part because the O.J.
Simpson trial was in progress in California.
106 Evidence about the jury's deliberations was admissible under COLO. R. EVID. 606(b) to
show "(1) the presence of improperly introduced extraneous materials; (2) the content of the
extraneous information; (3) whether the materials were used by jurors; and (4) whether they
were used before the jury reached its verdict." Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 627. Evidence was also
admissible regarding "[(5)] the nature of the extraneous information; and [(6)] during which
phase of deliberations it was presented." Id. at 629.
107 Harlan II, 109 P.3d at 620.
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reduce the sentence to life. 108 It again had no problem with the
appropriateness of the original death sentence. But, it thought that the
presence of the Bible meant the jury handed down the sentence under
the influence of an arbitrary factor, and thus reduced the sentence to
life imprisonment. 109
In Wiser, a juror used a dictionary to look up the definition of
"burglary," and the court found misconduct. The judge had given no
specific command to the jury against using the dictionary, other than
the instruction on the law of burglary to be applied to the defendant's
case. 110 In Wadle, a juror looked up the depression drug Paxil on the
Internet, despite the judge's specific instruction not to use outside
reference materials. From these cases, the Harlan II majority derived
the rule that "extraneous information is improper for juror
consideration whether or not the court specifically warned against its
108 Harlan I, 109 P.3d 616. Justice Gregory J. Hobbs wrote the majority opinion, and
Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey and Justice Alex J. Martinez joined him. Justice Nancy E. Rice
wrote a dissent and Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis joined her. Justices Michael L. Bender and
Nathan B. Coats recused themselves.
IN9Formerly COLO. REV. STAT. §. 16-11-103(6)(b), relocated to COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-1201(6) (2004); Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 620 ("[W]e can no longer say that Harlan's death
sentence was not influenced by passion, prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor."). This step,
rather than remanding to the trial court for a new sentence, is part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's duty under 8A COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(7)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1994). The Harlan H
Court was not clear whether they viewed the Wiser/Wadle inquiry as a component of their two-
step independent review of the death sentence. The court calls it an "additional basis" for their
conclusion, though they suggest that the two inquiries are intermingled earlier in the opinion.
The trial court found its guidance from Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1987) and
People v. Wadle 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004). Interestingly, there is nothing at all to indicate that
this test is appropriate or required for capital sentencing; neither Wiser nor Wadle was a death
penalty case. The Harlan H1 majority believed that though Wiser and Wadle dealt specifically
with the guilt phase, it was still applicable because the jury in capital cases is required to reach a
second "verdict," (the death sentence) and because the stakes are much higher. Harlan 11, 109
P.3d at 630. Wiser and Wadle set out a two-part test for confronting extraneous evidence. First,
the court decides if the jury used extraneous evidence, and, second, whether this extraneous
information created a "reasonable possibility" of prejudice to the defendant in the minds of an
"objective juror." The court gleaned the following factors from Wiser and Wadle as guideposts
in this:
(1) How the extraneous information relates to critical issues in the case; (2) How
authoritative is the source consulted; (3) whether a juror initiated the search for the
extraneous information; (4) whether the information obtained by one juror was
brought to the attention of another juror; (5) whether the information was presented
before the jury reached a unanimous verdict; and (6) whether the information would
be likely to influence a typical juror to the detriment of the defendant. Harlan IL 109
P.3d at 626 (citing Wadle, 97 P.3d at 937; Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1143).
As with the propriety of the two-step test at all, there is no clear mandate to use these six
factors. Justice Rice's dissent points out that the main focus is, overall, whether a reasonable
possibility of prejudice to the defendant existed. Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 636 n.8 (Rice & Kourlis,
JJ., dissenting); accord McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291 1308 (11 th Cir. 2005).
110 Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1141.
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use . . . where the extraneous information contains legal content
and where it contains factual information."' 11
The court overturned the verdict based on the scraps of testimony
Rule 606(b) left for it. The record compiled at the prejudice hearing
contained ample testimony of how the information actually affected
the jury's deliberations while sentencing Robert Harlan. 1 2 But, the
court could not consider it under Colorado Evidence Rule 606(b). The
court instead concluded that, to a typical juror, the Bible verses posed
a reasonable possibility of prejudicing Harlan. 13 Accordingly, the
second requirement of the Colorado Supreme Court's independent
review was not satisfied. 14 The majority's principal fear seemed to be
that the jury used the Biblical passages as an extra-judicial code,
substituting the Biblical principles it allegedly read for the
instructions and evidence presented.' 5 Further, the court feared the
jury sought refuge in the Biblical passages to unconstitutionally shirk
their civic responsibility." 6 But, at the same time, the majority
opinion disclaimed any implication that the jurors in this case could
not distinguish the jury instructions from the Biblical texts. Harlan's
jurors, by the court's logic, must have been superior to the typical
juror, who could not be expected to make this distinction between the
Bible and the jury instructions. 1 7 Harlan's jurors testified that they
could and that the Biblical passages had no effect. Yet, the court
could not take them at their word because of Rule 606(b).
Harlan II highlights two particular problems with the typical juror
standard. First, the court will often have to ignore actual testimony
controverting their decision on the objective likelihood of prejudice.
Five of Harlan's jurors testified they had not seen the Bible at all. The
I Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 625.
1121d. at 626 ("The record of the Bible Motion hearing contains much testimony by jurors
about the content of their deliberations and whether or not the Bible passages actually affected
the verdict. Rule 606(b) prevents us from considering this testimony.").
1 3 Id. at 620 (upholding trial court's determination that "there was a reasonable possibility
that use of the Bible in the jury room to demonstrate a requirement of the death penalty for the
crime of murder would have influenced a typical juror to reject a life sentence for Harlan.").
1 4 The second step of the Supreme Court's mandated independent review under COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-11-103.6(b) corresponds with the fourth step of the jury's sentencing sequence
under People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 736 (Colo. 1999).
11 Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 630.
1 6 Id. at 631. The Constitution requires state courts to overturn death sentences when the
jury believes that the responsibility for decision does not rest with them. Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985); see also McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1308
(l1th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge based on extraneous information where information
encouraged jurors to take their responsibilities seriously).
11 Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 631 ("[W]e do not suggest that the jurors who served in this case
were unable to distinguish between religious and state law.").
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Harlan II court discredited their testimony because they refused to
speak with the defense investigator initially. 1 8 In addition, one of the
jurors was specifically asked about the "eye for an eye" passage in
Leviticus, and noted that, though religious, he did not follow that
stem Old Testament edict, but instead, attempted to be fair in all that
he did.' 19 The juror who brought the Bible into the jury room, Ms.
Eaton-Ochoa, testified that she showed the passage in Romans to
another juror, Cordova, simply to point out that the Bible says "obey
the law of the land."
Second, the court may have trouble isolating the passages the jury
read.120 The trial court was unable to completely delimit during the
evidentiary hearing the passages the jury read. It expressed concern
over a passage suggesting jurors should deputize themselves to the
government as agents of "wrath to bring punishment to the
wrongdoer." This passage is found in Romans 13:4. The trial record
contained no reference to this passage. 121
The majority's disclaimer notwithstanding,1 22 the dissent accused
it of sacrificing substance for form. It accused the majority of splitting
legal hairs, resting their opinion on a distinction between written and
unwritten Biblical material. 123 The dissent pointed out that Harlan Ir s
rule is that jurors must use their moral scruples in sentencing, so long
as they do not need the assistance of the texts from which those
scruples derive. 124
18 Harlan 11, 109 P.3d 616, 635-36 (Colo. 2005) (Rice & Kourlis, JJ., dissenting).
119 Id. at 637.
20 Arguably, this problem would equally attend the actual effect test. Under Rule 606(b)
as it now reads, jurors can testify as to what specific passages they read. However, if courts
admit more testimony from the jurors (as they would under the scheme proposed in this note),
they are less likely to mistakenly exclude evidence bearing on what the jury read.
121 Id. at 635.
12 2 Id. at 631-32 ("Our legal analysis here is far from an inquiry that emphasizes the form
of the religious texts considered here over their substance.").
123 Id. at 632. If Harlan H can be read as prohibiting jurors from quoting memorized
Scripture, then it may be in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See
Galle, supra note 15, at 569 (arguing for strict scrutiny where religion figures in mental process
of jurors).
124 Harlan II, though, would likely allow the juror to read from the Bible in their hotel
room. The case demonstrates two primary objectives of the extraneous evidence rules: limiting
the jury's access in particular to case-specific facts, and limiting the number of jurors exposed
to any non-record material. Though the Biblical "facts" were not really case-specific, the
presence of the Bible in tangible form makes the Bible extrinsic evidence in that no one
introduced it into evidence, violating the second objective. Even though the prejudice probably
flows more from the religious nature of the source and not how tangible it is, Harlan I1 draws
that line because it is convenient. Another interesting case would be in a non-sequestered capital
jury, whether the juror could attend church services and read the Bible over the weekend.
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But, evidence rules, like all rules, must split hairs and draw lines,
and those lines all contain some element of arbitrariness. The law's
drawing of lines should only draw judicial ire when it does not do so
optimally. In the case of extraneous evidence, drawing the
"written/non-written" distinction is both a rule of convenience and a
relic of times when the fact that few could read or write meant written
extrinsic evidence was especially dangerous-those jurors who could
read could impose their own interpretation on the remainder of the
jury and command essentially total respect from those who could not
read.
To avoid such hair splitting, and assuming governing law allowed
it, the Colorado Supreme Court could have chosen two other options:
allowing both written and intangible "moral" material in the jury
room (which would raise serious issues because it would be difficult
to divide the world into "moral" and "non-moral" sources), or
banning both. Other courts have held that religious discussion during
capital jury proceedings is proper and even "not . . . surprising."1 25
Even the most ambitious attackers of religious material in capital
sentencing do not seek to ban all religious discussions from jury
deliberations.1 26 Thus, the line between written and non-written, while
perhaps arbitrary, is likewise proper.
Deeming a source extraneous does not end the inquiry. Courts
must assess whether the extraneous evidence prejudiced the
defendant. On their second look, the Colorado Supreme Court did not
consider the weight of the state's case against Robert Harlan as it did
the first time. In 2000, the court placated its fears of arbitrary jury
action (and allegations of racial prejudice) with the overwhelming
propriety of the sentence. After evidence of extraneous information
came out, the appropriateness of the sentence was not enough.
1 27
Other courts have agreed that prejudice from extraneous information
depends in part on the weight of the state's case and the "totality of
the circumstances." ' 128 The amount of time the jury deliberates is one
125 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983); Ashley, supra note 15, at 133 (citing Young v.
State, 12 P.3d 20, 29 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000), but arguing that religious discussion alone
constitutes impermissible extraneous evidence).
126 Ashley, supra note 15 at 158 n.188 (noting that the author "stop[s] short of advocating
that jury instructions must always and necessarily entail proscriptions against religion"). The
Harlan H dissent spoke to this point directly, 109 P.3d at 636 (Rice & Kourlis, JJ., dissenting),
127 Harlan 1, 8 P.3d 448, 500 (Colo. 2000).
28 McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 2005); Miller v. United
States, 135 F.3d 1254, 1256 (8th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 501 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 57:4
2007] THE GIDEONS AND THE GALLOWS
measure of this. 129 Harlan's jury convened for only parts of two days,
suggesting that the state's case was very persuasive.
30
As noted above, this Note does not fault Harlan Irs analysis of
"extraneous-ness." 131 Instead, this Note does take issue with the way
the court assessed prejudice. An actual effect test would strike a better
balance between the interests involved-a defendant's fair trial rights
and the state's interest in upholding the integrity of the jury system.
Courts could avoid the pitfalls described above in Harlan's case, and
reap the benefits described below. The next section begins with a
comparative example, discusses more of the merits of the typical and
actual juror tests, and then proposes a few solution options.
II. SOLUTIONS & ANALYSIS
A. Using an Actual Effect Test
The following section describes benefits courts could obtain from
using an actual effect test. It will contrast the typical juror standard
with the actual effect test.
An actual effect analysis would proceed as follows. The initial
stages mirror the typical juror test. If defendants believe the jury used
extraneous information, they file a motion to vacate the death
sentence with the trial court. If the trial court thinks the motion has
merit, it should hold a hearing and allow questioning of the jurors on
what extraneous information, if any, they used. 132 As before, the
129 See People v. Rudnick, 878 P.2d 16, 22 (Colo. App.1993) (pointing to short
deliberation time as evidence that juror pressure was minimal).
130 See, e.g., McNair, 416 F.3d at 1307-08 (noting that the strength of the case is relevant
to introduction of extrinsic evidence). By contrast, "lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult
case." United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F. 3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2001) (four-day
deliberations).
131 Consider also Harlan's situation, but in reverse. This occurred in the Utah case of State
v. Demille, 756 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1988). Utah's Supreme Court upheld a murder conviction
despite a juror's testimony that she convicted solely because her prayer for a sign was answered.
Id. at 83 ("She claimed to have received a revelation that if defense counsel did not make eye
contact with her when he presented his argument, DeMille was guilty-defense counsel did not
make the requisite eye contact."). The defendant contended that the juror sharing her epiphany
to her fellow jurors constituted prejudicial "outside influence." The court disagreed, and held
that sharing religious beliefs and "signs" was "certainly not an illegitimate inter-juror dynamic,"
and that Rule 606(b), to be construed narrowly, prevented inquiry any further. Id. at 84-85.
Thus, the court did not test "actual influence," despite clear evidence of illicit "substitution" of
the divine for the secular.
132 When deciding whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the court should "consider the
content of the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility
of the source." United States v. Brande, 329 F.3d 1173, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993)). The party attempting to show juror
misconduct must merely make a "colorable claim," United States v. Hemdon, 156 F.3d 629, 635
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defendant would have to first make a threshold showing of
misconduct, usually contained in a motion for a new trial. Then, states
could make their choice as to who bears the burden of showing
prejudice. 133 Also, the state would need to consider the standard of
persuasion. It would likely be "beyond a reasonable doubt" if the
prosecution bore the burden, 134 and "by a preponderance of the
evidence" if the defense bore the burden.'
35
Meeting this burden would require showing that at least one juror
voted for death because of ("but-for") the extraneous information. If
the burden were on the defendant to show prejudice, one juror would
suffice because a unanimous jury recommendation is required to
impose the death penalty. 136 Similarly, if the prosecution bore the
burden, they would have to show that no juror was actually affected
by the illicit evidence.
The parties may desire to treat the jurors like traditional witnesses
and impeach them for credibility. Each state could handle this
contingency as it now does under the "reasonable likelihood of
prejudice" evidentiary hearings. The states should consider several
factors. Would the use of extrinsic evidence (i.e., other witnesses)
(6th Cir. 1998), or a "credible allegation" that extraneous information was before the jury to
trigger a hearing. United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120, 124-25 (6th Cir. 1995).
133The state's decision would be subject to federal constitutional guarantees. However, the
Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held that any
fact that could potentially increase the penalty or sentence of a defendant must be proved by the
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt, would not be implicated. There is no point of increase
beyond death.
134 See, e.g., United States v. Prime, 431 F.3d 1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Dickson v.
Sullivan, 849 F.2d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 75, 80-81 n.2
(lst Cir. 1986).
135Few cases discuss who bears the burden in prejudice hearings. In Harlan II, the
Supreme Court of Colorado made no mention of which party bears the burden. At the federal
level, the prosecution generally bears the burden. See, e.g., Prime, 431 F.3d at 1157; United
States v. Ortiz, 393 F.3d 540, 549 (5th Cir. 2004); Williams, 809 F.2d at 80-81 n.2. However,
some state courts, including Colorado, have held that the defendant bears the burden. Harper v.
People, 817 P.2d 77, 81 (Colo. 1991) (defendant bears the burden of showing a reasonable
likelihood of prejudice from the juror misconduct).
136 Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988). Florida is the lone exception to this rle. The
Florida Supreme Court refuses to entertain challenges to Florida's death penalty statutes, which
do not require a unanimous recommendation of death for death to be imposed. See, e.g.,
Delgado v. State, 948 So. 2d 681, 686 (Fla. 2006) ("In addition, we have repeatedly rejected
Ring [sic] claims similar to Delgado's [premised on the theory that non-unanimous death
recommendations violate the Sixth Amendment as understood in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) and Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466] and deny [the] claim without further discussion."); see also
FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2006) (setting out Florida's death penalty procedure, where the jury
makes a recommendation to the judge and the judge decides whether to impose death). Thus, in
Florida, for a defendant to have been actually prejudiced, it would have to be shown not only
that the judge's decision depended on the recommendation of the jury, but also that if the
affected jurors had not been exposed to extraneous information, they would have recommended
life.
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waste time? Prohibitions on extrinsic evidence usually stem from a
desire to save time. 137 Nevertheless, capital courts are willing to take
their time. Delay does not excuse incomplete truth-seeking. What
would impeachment of a testifying juror look like? It would be
especially difficult to impeach a juror's conclusions about extraneous
Biblical information. 138 To do so, one side might call an expert to
testify as to the meaning of a specific Biblical passage. But a central
theme of this Note has been that different jurors can draw different
inferences from such information, and that each juror's testimony
about their personal deliberations should be given great weight.
However, it might be important to the judge (who must weigh each
juror's credibility) to know what the generally accepted theories of
interpretation for a particular source are, or at least the competing and
most common theories. The Federal Rules (and their analogs in the
states) provide the authority for the judge to call expert witnesses for
assistance in this regard, and it might be relevant on the credibility of
each juror's testimony about the effect of extraneous information.' 39
These would be policy judgments each state would have to make.
Judges can still proscribe specific sources (like medical texts or
dictionaries or Bibles). Even without specific proscribing instructions,
courts do not allow juries to consult extra-record evidence during
deliberations. But, the judge must still decide what to do when the
jury disobeys. The judge can decide whether the error was harmless
or prejudicial, or can presume prejudice. This Note will deal with
both choices. It will conclude that the first inquiry is the appropriate
one, and that an actual effect test is the proper means to effectuate it.
1. The Perils of Objectivity
Though widely used in capital review and elsewhere for their
analytical convenience, 14 objective tests like the typical juror test are
137See FED. R. EvID. 608(b) (prohibiting proof by extrinsic evidence of specific acts of
untruthful conduct to impeach a witness).
138 This is another instance where this Note's force peaks in Biblical information cases.
139 See FED. R. EViD. 614(a) ("The court may ... call witnesses."); FED. R. EvrD. 706(a)
("The court may ... appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.").
140 Capital reviewing courts apply objective tests to various portions of capital sentencing.
For instance, in the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel, once defendants show
their attorney fell below the standard of a reasonable attorney and that this created an
objectively "reasonable possibility" of prejudice, they may obtain post-conviction relief.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 692 (1984). Courts review capital jury
instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances for whether they could have been
applied by a reasonable juror in an unconstitutional way. Mills 486 U.S. 367. Interestingly, the
Mills court left open the question of what it would do if the trial or subsequent hearings adduced
extrinsic evidence demonstrating that the jury did not actually apply the instructions in an
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not panaceas. Objectivity trades convenience and ease of proof for
accuracy. The typical juror test (an objective test) assumes that the
trial court will be able to identify, isolate, and characterize extraneous
information that the jury read, and then determine how it affected the
typical juror.' 4' For extraneous material arguably brought in to assist
the independent moral assessment, the problem of identification
becomes acute. It is easier to determine whether a juror could draw
prejudicial inferences from the definition of burglary than from the
Bible. For instance, Biblical passages, when removed from their
surrounding context, are malleable both to condemn or to acquit. 
41
This reality explodes the idea that a court can say whether or not a
particular passage prejudiced a typical juror since it is unclear what
particular moral inference a typical juror would draw. 143 Colorado
unconstitutional way: "There is, of course, no extrinsic evidence of what the jury in this case
actually thought... Our reading of those parts of the record leads us to conclude that there is at
least a substantial risk that the jury was misinformed." 1d. at 381 (emphasis added). Objective
legal proofs assist courts in efficiently resolving legal disputes, though they rest on the legal
fiction of the "reasonable actor." Courts use objective tests in the following circumstances,
among others: (1) When individual perspective is unimportant. In criminal law, because
subjective mental state dictates culpability, a subjective test is employed. Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782 (1982). (2) Where the danger of untraceable idiosyncrasies is especially pressing
(probably a big reason for the employment of an objective test as in Wiser and Wadle). "[A]n
objective test was preferable to a subjective test in part because it does not place upon the police
the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question."
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662 (2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing the test for whether a suspect has been taken into "custody" during a traffic
stop by police). Although arguably capital sentencing is such a situation, voir dire and strict
instructions are likely sufficient to root out insidious bias. (3) When requiring a person to testify
in open court seems particularly (if vaguely) distasteful. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468,
480-81 (1936) (highlighting the administrative law concept of granting substantial deference to
the agency head on whether the head actually "heard" the evidence before making the final
decision in an administrative adjudication because an evidentiary hearing would be required and
the agency head would have to be deposed to testify as to his state of mind). This deference is so
great that reviewing courts, in effect, require only objective proof that the agency head
considered the record below in good faith. (4) When mutual understanding is required; (5)
When courts fear a "flood of litigation," and problems of proof. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S.
314, 331-32 (1996) (noting that inquiry into the subjective motives of a habeas petitioner
creates unneeded complexity and is often unanswerable); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing the problems of a subjective test for causation in informed consent
to medical treatment decisions). Most of these dangers recede for jurors, strengthening the case
for applying "actual effect" analysis.
141 Courts are typically comfortable with determining the behavior of fictional
personifications (e.g., musing on the reasonable man in tort law). But, in the case of a legal
personification (the typical juror) charged with making an idiosyncratic, personal decision about
the life or death of another, they should instead paint the typical juror with the brush of an actual
juror's testimony.
142 History demonstrates this-individuals making misguided defenses of the Crusades and
slavery in America come to mind.
143 Ashley, supra note 15, at 152 (quoting a juror's statement that she and her fellow jurors
felt compelled to pray for the defendant). In Lenz v. True, 370 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Va. 2005),
a district court dismissed the defendant's habeas petition appealing his death sentence because
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courts do not even care whether the inference is reasonable. 144 Its
courts ask instead whether a typical juror (rather than a reasonable
juror) would draw a prejudicial inference.
When the court examines extraneous material seeking a typical
juror's inference, and that material is religious, the court casts itself in
the role of religious interpreter. The court's typical juror net scoops
up some cases and vacates the jury's sentence when extraneous
information had no actual effect. But in other cases, the court
concludes that the passages it thinks the jury actually read would not
bias a typical juror in favor of death. It then upholds a death sentence,
even if scrutiny would reveal jury misconduct. To be clear, the court
might not think a particular passage would bias typical jurors, when it
actually biased the real jurors in the case. This could result in the
either of two types of appellate error-mistaken condemnation (death
sentence or conviction at the trial stage) or mistaken reprieve (life
sentence or acquittal at the trial stage. While mistaken condemnation
is obviously the more troubling of the two, 14 5 important societal
interests also attend known mistaken reprieves.
1 46
2. The Merits of Actual Effect Analysis
But, why make the change? Any change in longstanding legal
doctrine requires justification. New exceptions require proof that they
will not swallow the rule to which they apply. This Note's thesis is
that because of the unique nature of capital cases and the heightened
scrutiny they demand, the benefits of using an actual effect test
outweigh the burdens.
he could not prove which verses of the Bible the jury read. It upheld the Virginia Supreme
Court's determination that the Biblical passages did not raise an inference of prejudice under
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954). Id.
'"People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932, 937 (Colo. 2004) ("[T]he objective test is concerned
with typicality, not objective reasonableness.").
'45See, e.g., COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 48, at 706 n.4 (quoting John Adams's
discussion of the danger of mistaken conviction in closing arguments during the trial of the
British soldiers who killed Crispus Attucks and others at the Boston Massacre, where he
represented the soldiers: "[lit is of more importance to [the] community that innocence should
be protected than it is that guilty should be punished.. . when innocence itself is brought to the
bar and condemned, especially to die, the subject will exclaim, 'It is immaterial to me whether I
behave well or ill, for virtue itself is no security.' And if such a sentiment as this should take
place in the mind of the subject there would be an end to all security whatsoever.").
'46For a discussion of these societal interests, see Thomas M. DiBiagio, Judicial Equity:
An Argument for Post-Acquittal Retrial when the Judicial Process is Fundamentally Defective,
46 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 102 (1996).
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i. Actual effect review provides closer scrutiny when it is needed
most-in capital cases
Capital juries enjoy more discretion than typical criminal juries
and sentencing judges. 147 As discussed above, decisions in capital
cases at all stages are subject to heightened scrutiny relative to regular
criminal cases. 148 This, along with the gravity of the capital juror's
decision, makes recent empirical studies showing that the selection
process biases capital jurors in favor of both conviction and death
quite troubling. 149 In addition, it was the fear of unchecked discretion
and bias that motivated the court in Furman v. Georgia to fell the
U.S. death penalty system. 50 A hearing to test the actual effect of
extraneous information would help uncover that bias through the
window of "spillover" from the actual effect test. Although the
hearing would only be triggered by extraneous information and thus
wouldn't be available to all capital defendants, it would ensure that,
when a juror errs, reviewing courts expose a juror's errors to
maximum scrutiny. The jury's collective power and each juror's lack
of obligation to explain their collective sentence mean that the jurors
themselves should testify when the court finds irregularities in their
sentence. Capital cases demand no less.
Critics of this approach will contend that it is merely a way to
railroad defendants because it arguably requires a higher standard for
defendants to prove bias. But, it may also benefit defendants. Rather
than railroading them, it may save their lives. Suppose a defendant is
convicted and the jury references extraneous Biblical passages. A
reviewing court could determine that the extraneous passages were
not "reasonably prejudicial," to a typical juror, when an actual juror
voted for death because it thought the passage commanded it. Under
the Wiser/Wadle typical juror standard, a reviewing court would
uphold the biased sentence.
147 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 34-35 (1986).
148See Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2527-29 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing the
decreased tolerance for errors in capital cases).
149 See Luginbuhl & Middendorf, supra note 42 (showing that death-qualified jurors are
more likely to convict); Allen, Mabry, & McKelton, supra note 45. However, as the authors
point out, their studies do not, and likely cannot account for the group interaction that occurs in
jury deliberations. Id. at 724. Opponents of the death penalty claim that the command in
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) that capital jurors be "death-qualified" (i.e. state that
they would potentially vote for the death penalty) prejudices the process against defendants.
150 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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ii. Actual effect review accounts for the court's inability to accurately
determine what a typical juror would infer from a passage, especially
when the juror uses the passage for moral guidance
Different courts have reached different conclusions about the
prejudice of the same Biblical passage. One of the passages at issue in
Harlan II was Romans 13:1. The court thought that the passage would
coerce jurors to vote for death. By its terms, the passage simply
commands obedience to civil authority. Harlan's trial court could not
escape considering the passage in its context during the evidentiary
hearing. The court's analysis included passages that the jury did not
read.15
1
Yet in Fields v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a case where
the jurors read precisely the same passage from Romans and an
equivalent passage from Leviticus. 152 Indeed, in Fields the miscreant
juror was the foreman, someone charismatic enough to persuade the
other jurors to appoint him to that post. Yet, the court found no
prejudice. 153 The court held that the passages were "common
knowledge," and reasoned that the words were part of the body of
knowledge that a typical juror would possess.
Courts may struggle to interpret extraneous information and tease
out the typical juror's inference on any piece of extraneous
information. This difficulty increases with the "moral-ness" of the
information. Indeed, both the Old Testament and the New Testament
in particular are replete with passages demonstrating both God's
mercy (and his command for his followers to do the same), and of
examples of His wrath. 154 Fields and Harlan I illustrate this
difficulty. 155 Under the typical juror test, then, reviewing courts might
151 Harlan II, 109 P.3d 616, 635 (Colo. 2005) (Rice & Kourlis, JJ., dissenting). Also, as
noted above, while jurors can testify about what passages they read under the current version of
Rule 606(b) and under the typical juror, if courts admit more of their testimony, they are less
likely to exclude relevant testimony on what was read or discussed and less likely to commit
this type of error.
152431 F.3d 1186, 1207 (9th Cir. 2005). The jury foreman made a "pro/con" list about
whether the jury should impose death that included this item on the "pro"[-death] side. Id.
153 The Fields jury committed a more severe series of crimes than the Harlan jury, though
the court does not mention this fact in their analysis of the prejudice wrought by the Bible
verses.
14Beggs, supra note 16, at 160-61 (detailing three such examples-Numbers 35:6, 16-28
(the City of Refuge for criminals); Genesis 19:15-16 (Lot and the destruction of Sodom and
Gomorrah); and Exodus 32:1-14 (the Golden Calf)). For a good discussion of Christian views
on capital punishment, see GERALD A. MCHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
TOWARD A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1978); Stephen P. Garvey, "As
the Gentle Rain from Heaven": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 997
(1996).155 One implicit assumption of this argument is that "typical jurors" in Colorado and
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improperly uphold a sentence. As discussed above, the court might
find a passage not prejudicial when jurors actually drew prejudicial
inferences.1
56
iii. Actual effect review accounts for the fact that the parties are most
likely to put Biblical passages "at issue" during capital sentencing
When the court tells jurors to make an independent moral
assessment, jurors likely respond with confusion. They are supposed
to make a judgment about a defendant who may have just quoted at
length about Biblical commands for mercy in his allocution
statement. They likely just heard repeated character evidence about
whatever ties to Christianity or some other religion the defense can
show. The court both restricts them to the information in the record
and instructs them to view that record in light of their background.
The temptation to indulge in extraneous moral inquiry and
commentary can prove too tempting for judges, 157 and no less so for
jurors. The same Bible verses appear with regularity. During Harlan's
voir dire, a defense attorney presciently questioned one of the jurors
about the very Leviticus passage the jury ultimately read and
discussed. 158 Of course, this, like the remainder of evidence the
defense adduced during prejudice hearings, escaped the Harlan II
court's review thanks to Rule 606(b).
In Harlan II, the prosecution argued that Harlan's attorneys put
religion at issue by comparing Abraham and Isaac to the relationship
of Robert Harlan with his father and making extensive religious
references. 159 The Harlan II court thought the defense counsel's
California are merely different. But neither court couched their analysis in terms of local
idiosyncrasies.
156 To be sure, under the actual effect test, two trial judges might reach opposite conclusion
about prejudice, as the courts in Fields and Harlan 11 did. But still, in capital cases, since this
error is an unavoidable consequence of an imperfect legal system, it should come based on the
interpretation of the jury's testimony, and not from the differing dispositions of two judges
musing about hypothetical effects. However, the capital regime evinces a bias for the jury as a
decision-maker, which should be followed here.
157 See, e.g., Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2005), reh'g en banc denied, No.
03-4375, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 6618 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2005) (upholding a 51-year sentence for
a child molester though the judge cited a passage from the Book of Matthew at sentencing).
158 Harlan 11, 109 P.3d 616, 634, 637 (Colo. 2005) (Rice & Kourlis, JJ., dissenting). The
juror, who ultimately was impaneled, noted he didn't subscribe to the "eye for an eye" approach
supported by the Leviticus passage, as noted above.
159 Genesis 22. God wanted to test Abraham's faith. God ordered Abraham to take his son
Isaac up a mountain and offer him as a sacrifice to God. When he saw Abraham's faith, God
provided a ram for Abraham to slaughter and sacrifice as a burnt offering instead. Sacrificing
Isaac would have been incredibly difficult for Abraham-Isaac's birth was totally unexpected
(Abraham and his wife were very old, so old that Abraham's wife is said to have burst into
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closing statement was a "legitimate plea for mercy," and not an
invitation to the jury to bring in the Bible during sentencing.60
Other courts have also dismissed this "invited error" argument. In
State v. Haselden, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
prosecutor's Biblical references in anticipation of defense closing
argument were proper because either side could use the Bible to argue
in favor of mercy or retribution.1 6' Granted, the danger of
"substitution" of these Biblical precepts for secular law is lower for
closing arguments than for extraneous materials during jury
deliberations because the intrusion of Biblical material during
deliberations is simply closer (chronologically) to the point of
decision.
162
The two dissenting justices in Haselden chastised the majority for
not enforcing North Carolina's rule "discourag[ing]" the use of
religious arguments because their use is "distracting," and leading to
an endless arms race of "ecclesiastical artillery."'163 They also noted
widespread criticism of religious argument at the federal level, but
even then would not totally preclude religious argument, and argued
for an actual effect standard like the one proposed here:
[T]here is a place for religious and moral arguments in our
jurisprudence. However, in order to give guidance to litigants
and judges, this Court should hold that any argument that
essentially asks a jury to base its decision on moral or
religious grounds instead of on the law and the evidence is
improper and grounds for reversal. 164
The Haselden dissent pointed out that the prosecutor asked the
jury to substitute Biblical precepts for the law of the case by saying in
closing argument that both the Biblical passage and North Carolina
laughter when she heard the news), and Abraham treasured him. Genesis 21. The defense thus
compared Harlan's father, a retired police detective, to Abraham, because he turned in
incriminating evidence to the police. Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 633.
1 O°Harlan 11, 109 P.3d at 632. Or, the problem could be solved by also allowing the
prosecution to comment on the Biblical references.
161 State v. Haselden, 577 S.E.2d 594, 615 (N.C. 2003) (Brady & Lake, JJ., concurring)
("Therefore, arbitrarily eliminating only one category of argument would unfairly limit the
ability of prosecutors to communicate to the jury that the ultimate punishment of death is
sometimes appropriate. Likewise, such a standard would unfairly limit the ability of defense
counsel to persuade the jury to spare the defendant's life.").
162 Also, if the references occur during closing, the opposition can give a meaningful (if
only oratorical) adversarial response. In the jury room, this of course cannot happen.163Id. at 616-17 (Edmunds & Orr, JJ., dissenting).
164Id. at 617 (Edmunds & Off, JJ., dissenting).
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law were "statutes of judgment."1 65 Both sides' interpretations affirm
a key premise of this Note-that the presence of the Bible or the
presence of religious arguments alone do not ipso facto prejudice a
defendant. Courts should still hold a prejudice hearing where
prejudice gets determined by listening to the testimony of the jurors
as to the actual effect of the extraneous materials on their
deliberation. Further, the Supreme Court of the United States has
frequently and consistently held that all juries are supposed to reflect
the moral sensibilities of the community, and that capital jurors must
individually make a moral assessment of the defendant. 166 Because
both sides usually offer evidence about religion, the court should be
willing to look closer to see if the jury was in fact biased by this
evidence.
iv. Actual effect review reduces arbitrariness
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the death penalty is a mess. 167
(This should be apparent from the foregoing discussion, which
sketches only the tip of the iceberg.) But one clear aim emerges from
it: rooting out arbitrariness. 68 Whenever the Supreme Court must
pick between two procedural alternatives, it prefers the one that
reduces (even if it does not eradicate) arbitrariness.
What is an "arbitrary" result? In the law, it is usually understood to
mean treating two material equals differently for an immaterial
165 Id. at 617-18 (Edmunds & Orr, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that the prosecutor told the
jury: "North Carolina Statute 15A-2000 is a statute ofjudgment... And what does it say in the
Bible about a statute of judgment? A statute of judgment unto you throughout your generations
and all your dwellings. Whosoever killeth any person, the murderer shall be put to the death by
the mouth of witnesses.").
166 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1984) (rejecting petitioner's argument that
the death penalty must be issued by the jury, but noting that juries are supposed to express the
moral voice of the community); cf. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1975) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 1076, at 8 (1968)) ("It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to
understand the case, but also to reflect the community's sense of justice in deciding it.").
167 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), overruled in part
by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Paul Schiff Berman, Review Essay: The Cultural Life
of Capital Punishment: Surveying the Benefits of a Cultural Analysis of Law, 102 COLuM. L.
Rev. 1129, 1130 n.3 (2002) (reviewing AUSTIN SARAT, WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION (2001)) (collecting sources describing the
"complicated regulatory apparatus").
168See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 221-26 (1976) (plurality opinion) (White &
Rehnquist, JJ., Burger, C.J., concurring) (holding that procedures that substantially reduce the
risk of arbitrariness meet the Eighth Amendment's terms); Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth
Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REv. 771, 772
(2005) (arguing that the decision in Gregg was incorrect, but noting that Gregg cements a
preference for those procedures that most substantially reduce arbitrariness).
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reason, an incorrect reason, or no reason at all. 169 A result can also be
arbitrary if two polar opposites are treated as their respective polar
opposite (e.g., giving innocents the death penalty and allowing serial
killers to live).
For an example of this second sort, consider two adjacent capital
courtrooms, with defendants in identical circumstances. Both
defendants receive a death sentence. The defendant in Courtroom 1
awaits execution. However, the jury in Courtroom 2 consults the
Bible during deliberations, and the judge determines it posed a
reasonable likelihood of prejudice to a typical juror. The jury might
actually have been prejudiced by the presence of the Biblical text. In
this case, the result would not have been arbitrary. The defendant in
Courtroom 2 was denied a fair sentence. However, the jury might not
have been prejudiced, and this result would be arbitrary-the
defendant in Courtroom 1 would be treated differently from
Courtroom 2 for an immaterial reason. If a judge could use actual
juror testimony about the effect of the extraneous information on their
deliberations, it would decrease the likelihood of this result. Thus, it
would yield less arbitrariness than the typical juror standard, and is
constitutionally preferred.
170
v. When a capital sentence is vacated on questionable grounds,
political uproar threatens judicial legitimacy
The typical juror standard reflects a desire for jury secrecy. 171 The
argument is that the public does not want to know what actually
transpires in deliberations, because it will undermine the public
confidence that legitimizes government.1 72  But, when courts
hypothesize about typical citizens without using actual testimony
when it is available in the high-stakes realm of death penalty cases,
societal uproar may ensue that may itself threaten judicial
legitimacy. 173 This is especially true in capital cases, where the crimes
169See Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 789-90. Substantive law sets what counts as "material."
For instance, state statutes define what makes one capital defendant materially different from
others-statutorily defined aggravating factors.
170 See id at 803 (collecting cases showing that "lower courts have rejected testimony that,
if allowed, would have shown that a juror arbitrarily imposed death").
1 This goal is implemented by, for example, Rule 606(b). See infra. Part III(B)
172 See Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 813 (noting that this argument depends on the
assumption (in the author's view, an erroneous one) that the public would rather have wrongs
swept under the rug than brought to light).
173 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 865 (1992) ("The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the judiciary as fit to determine what
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are often quite grisly. After all, governmental institutions derive their
legitimacy from public support. One role for the jury is to connect the
public to the administration of justice. Whenever courts upset this,
they risk political reprisal. This can come in many forms, the most
obvious being legislative action. 174 In Robert Harlan's case, the
decision catalyzed Colorado Senate Concurrent Resolution 8, a
proposal sponsored by Republican state senator Doug Lamborn.1
75
The Resolution proposed a constitutional amendment to make judges
removable by the same procedures (petitions and special elections) as
Colorado state legislators. 176 The bill died in committee, but local
commentators suggested that the issue will appear again. 177 The
danger grows when courts ignore actual evidence from the jurors.
Capital cases add still more tension because the public cares more
about the sentence. 178 At the very least, judges might deflect some of
this criticism by noting that they decided whether extraneous
information (particularly in the case of the Bible, near to the hearts of
many citizens) prejudiced the defendant subjectively, based on the
testimony of those called to pass judgment upon him.
Finally, all states have an interest in seeing the work and civic
responsibility they assign its jurors granted respect. Capital jurors
bear a weightier burden than non-capital jurors. They make an
unquestionably "awesome" decision-whether to take another
human's life. 17 9 But, when the jury's requirements remain shrouded in
mystery and uncertainty even to some Supreme Court Justices, it is
fair to say that society can expect little better of jurors instructed to
rigidly obey aggravating circumstances and then postulate any
number of mitigating factors and balance them in a moral way.180
the Nation's law means and to declare what it demands.").
74
'The vast literature on legislative branch control of the judiciary exceeds this Note's
scope. For discussion, see Robert N. Strassfeld, Symposium, Judicial Independence and
Judicial Accountability: Searching for the Right Balance: Introduction: "Atrocious Judges"
and "Odious" Courts Revisited, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 899 (2006).
175S. Con. Res. 05-008, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2005).
176 Id.
177 John Andrews, Op-Ed., Why Not Recall Judges?, DENVER POST, May 1, 2005, at E5.
178 This was certainly true in Robert Harlan's case. The Supreme Court decision sparked a
flurry of letters to the editor, and columns in local newspapers. See, e.g., Felix Doligosa, Jr., Life
term for Harlan; Notorious Killer was Spared Death by State High Court, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, December 20, 2005, at A29; Michael Ortiz, Letter to the Editor, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, July 13, 2005, at A48; David Harsanyi, When the Good Book's A Bad Thing, DENVER
POST, March 31, 2005, at BI; Diane Carman, Schiavo Case, Bible Ruling, Rape Bill Cook Up
Feast of Irony, THE DENVER POST, March 31, 2005, at B5.
179 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 324 (1985) (quoting the defense's argument
against the imposition of the death penalty on the defendant).
'sOSee Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 666-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Berger,
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Arguably, the jury will be more sensitive to the facts of the case and
their emotional impact-this connection with community emotions
and morals is why it (and not a judge) is used in most trials. Courts
should be willing to listen to jurors' testimony about the substance of
their deliberations to see if an error they made was fatal to their
decision. If the decision is vested with the jury because it is better
than a judge at making moral assessments, then the judges of a
reviewing court should be reluctant to overturn its sentence absent
evidence from the actual jurors that something legally impermissible
substantively interfered with their individual moral judgments.
Indeed, the Constitution now all but precludes judges from
exercising the jury's role in capital cases. 81 However, reviewing
courts do not review a jury's sentence the way they review a judge's
sentence. Trial judges leave a "footprint" in the form of their opinion.
Reviewing courts can thus test the substance of their sentence for the
effect of potential prejudice.' 82 A jury's analogous footprint is
inadmissible per Rule 606(b). Thus, reviewing courts cannot test the
jury's reasoning and cannot test the actual effects of any extraneous
evidence on its sentence.
183
supra note 64, at 1079-82.
181 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that the jury, and not a judge,
must find all aggravating circumstances in a capital case).
'
82 See Arnett v. Jackson 393 F.3d 681, 686 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 207
(2005).
183 Of course, one alternative (an alternative that raises too many issues and necessitates
too many caveats to be within this Note's scope) would be to have the jury compose a
sentencing opinion explaining their verdict.
On this score, reviewing courts should obtain jury testimony as to actual effect for
precisely the same reasons they require reasoned decision-making from administrative
agencies-wide latitude in decision-making and a relative absence of checks and balances. To
be sure, capital proceedings feature many "checks and balances." See supra Part 1(B). Yet, on
the particular balancing between aggravating and mitigating circumstances, there are relatively
few limits on the jury's discretion. But cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (remanding a dispute
over agency action to the district court because the agency head had not clearly stated the basis
for his decision, and leaving open the possibility that the agency head could be called to testify).
Similarly, because governments that choose to allow juries to sentence defendants to death grant
them so much responsibility, courts should be loath to overturn that sentence absent evidence of
an actual negative effect of extraneous evidence on the death sentence. The words of some
prominent commentators on administrative law apply, if only by analogy: "The existence of this
substantial discretion within agencies explains in part another set of concerns that motivates
courts .... Where discretion exists, there is always the potential for its abuse. This danger is
particularly acute where the substantive standards . . . are vague .. . . [Discretion could be
exercised for corrupt reasons ... or it could simply be exercised in a sloppy manner." RICHARD
J. PIERCE, JR., SYDNEY A. SHAPIRO, & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
125 (4th ed. 2004). The Constitution favors (arguably requires) jurors to be the sentencer,
treating them like the moral experts, to continue the administrative law metaphor. Thereby, they
should at least be entitled to testify as to their deliberations in answering charges of irregularity
rather than substituting their own conclusions about the potential effect of extraneous material.
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Because the choice is such a personal one, reviewing courts should
ask for and consider the jury's testimony on the role of extraneous
evidence. In this way, reviewing courts can help to avoid the political
reprisal and charges of a counter-majoritarian judiciary that might
ensue under a typical juror test. The reviewing court that strikes down
or upholds a death sentence will have concrete, real-life testimony
from the actual individuals affected by the extraneous evidence to
mollify the public.
The capital system, like the jury system as a whole, is balanced
atop a pyramid of legal fictions-that juries represent the moral sense
of the community, that they decide cases objectively, that they
sentence defendants to die who deserve it in some cosmic sense and
withhold it from the undeserving, that they must have rigidly
channeled discretion in determining the defendant's sentence, 84 but
unfettered discretion in choosing life.1 5 Jurors must simultaneously
express both their own independent moral assessment and be the
conduit between the community and the administration of justice.
When jurors make their unenviable decision, their work should not be
Cf FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (holding that the FCC's
determination of the public interest in broadcasting was a specialized matter on which the
agency was entitled to discretion). From Pierce et al., again if only by analogy: "[R]eviewing
courts tend to defer to agencies because agencies often have superior knowledge of the wide
range of factors that should be considered .... [Arguing that the courts should not exercise this
role] could only be supported by studies demonstrating that generalist judges, who may be
called upon to review a particular dispute in a specialized area once or twice a year, have a
knowledge of that area superior to agency decision makers who are required to resolve hundreds
of similar and related disputes each year." PIERCE, ET AL. supra note 183, at 123-24. Pierce, et
al., later point out that, though relatively unaccountable agencies must be held to answer when
they deviate from prescribed procedures, the court should not substitute its judgment for that of
the agency. Id. at 365. This is not to say that judges lose their moral sense when they ascend to
the bench. But, in sharply limiting the judge's role in capital sentences, the Supreme Court
(interpreting the Constitution, especially the Sixth Amendment) prefers juries to judges.
Furthermore, the juridical calling requires judges to doggedly pursue impartiality and remove
themselves from the very emotional and moral impulses that jurors use in their independent
moral assessment.
The actual effect method thus recognizes the discretion the jury receives in capital
sentencing in two ways the typical juror method does not, again analogous to agencies. It both
makes them more accountable by requiring them to give reasons for their decision when they
made the error of consulting extraneous information (by requiring them to answer questions at
the prejudice hearing), and shows deference by only overturning their sentence if the extraneous
evidence happened to actually effect the sentence, and by at least deigning to hear their
testimony.
184See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty is unconstitutional).
15 This is the central paradox of modem death penalty law. Compare Furman, 408 U.S.
238 (holding that arbitrary imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional), with Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty
system-which was one way of permanently eliminating arbitrariness-on the grounds that
capital sentencers also needed to have discretion).
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upset unless, among other things, mistaken consultation of extraneous
evidence actually affected their sentence. The actual juror test helps to
ensure that the death penalty is meted out fairly and appropriately,
while protecting defendants from those jurors who cannot reach a
sentence on permissible grounds if they or someone else commit an
error like using extraneous material to sentence. 186 This Note argues
that, when the jury has left a "footprint" of how the extraneous
evidence affected it in a capital case, reviewing courts should honor
it.
3. Problems with Actual Effect Analysis
The actual effect test has its share of problems, too.
First, it relies more on juror testimony and memory than the
typical juror test. Whenever memory is involved, the potential for
fallibility enters. But, juror testimony poses no greater danger than
that of witnesses or parties. And jurors lack some of the incentives
parties and material witnesses have to lie. Jurors have as potential
incentives only their own sense of guilt for sentencing a defendant to
die, or perhaps bribery from outside parties.
Even capital courts, however, have confidence in the ability of voir
dire to remove the extremely careless or illicitly motivated jurors, and
of good jury instructions to rehabilitate those that voir dire leaves
behind. 187 Both capital and non-capital courts follow a strong
presumption of juror competence and rectitude. 188 But when the jury
has even more power, as it does in capital cases, courts should be
willing to probe more deeply into the jury's mind, rather than settling
for their own conclusions-even though the court must still weigh
credibility and make the ultimate decision. In this sense, the actual
186 Harlan 1, 8 P.3d 448, 485 (Colo. 2000). Colorado's death penalty statute was passed in
1991 in response to a proclamation from then-Governor Romer in response to several judicial
decisions rendering it inoperable. See People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834, 846-47 (Colo. 1991)
(holding the then operative death penalty statute unconstitutional). The subjective test also
recognizes the balancing that must be done between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses vis-A-vis jurors and the Due Process Clause and Establishment Clause vis-t-vis
defendants.
187 See, e.g., Harlan 1, 8 P.3d at 500.
188 This was noted above, in section (ll)(B)(3). See United States v. Lomeli, 76 F.3d 146,
149 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954)); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984) ("The assessment of prejudice should proceed on the
assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the
standards that govern the decision."); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (upholding a
statutory aggravator because the factor had a "common-sense core" that courts could presume
jurors understand).
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effect test both honors the jury's discretion and safeguards defendants
from that discretion more than the typical juror test.
"Impracticality" is the strongest critique. "Subjective" tests like the
actual effect test are often rejected because they may require separate
evidentiary hearings.' 89 Thus, a serious argument against the actual
effect test can be made on judicial economy grounds. Death penalty
cases are already extraordinarily expensive. 190  Also, proving
subjective state of mind may be quite difficult. There may be little
circumstantial evidence to substantiate or discount any juror
testimony.
But, in a modem judicial system quite comfortable (and rightly so)
with the thicket of procedure separating convicted capital felons from
the death penalty, one more bramble appears trivial.' 9' Courts would
not need to change the logistics of the current prejudice hearing, just
the admissibility rules. 1
92
Perhaps the attorneys would require more time since there might
be simply more questions to ask. But, under actual effect analysis in
capital cases, more lengthy questioning may not even be required.
Justice Hobbs, writing for the Harlan H majority, noted that the
89 See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986). The "actual effect"-"typical
juror" dichotomy overlaps the "subjective"-"objective" distinction found throughout law.
Harlan I, 109 P.3d 616, 625 (Colo. 2005) ("Accordingly, we adopted an 'objective test' for
ascertaining 'prejudice."'). "Actual effect" testing probes the impact of extraneous information
on the jury's deliberations. 'Typical juror" testing tells the court to imagine a reasonable juror,
and then to divine the effect that a particular passage would have on the juror. Both involve
probing the mind of an actor, one actual, and one fictional. But since courts attempt to fill the
latter's head with objectively reasonable content about the effect of extraneous information, the
determination is more objective than subjective. Thus, the "actual effect" test bears all of the
burdens of other subjective tests.
The extensive literature on the "other minds" problem illustrates the law's difficulty with
"subjective" tests. See King v. Shipley, (1784) 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 828 (K.B.) (4 Doug. 73, 178).
("What passes in the mind of man is not scrutable by any human tribunal; it is only to be
collected from his acts."); Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the
Bounds of Testamentary Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959
(2006) (discussing the problem in the probate context); Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided:
How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Realities and Overlook Cultural Differences,
49 HOW. L. J. 1 (2005) (collecting cases and commentary). For a more theoretical discussion of
the problem, see D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for
the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REv. 1281 (2004).
190 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 48, at 37-42.
191 This argument is less convincing, then, in non-capital cases, where less procedure is
often afforded.
192 United States v. Edelin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing United States v.
Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 378 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[T]rial judges are afforded considerable discretion
in determining the amount of inquiry necessary, if any, in response to allegations of jury
misconduct.")); cf United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("We do not
now hold that any false statement or deliberate concealment by a juror necessitates an
evidentiary hearing.").
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hearing adduced "much testimony by jurors about the content of their
deliberations and whether or not the Bible passages actually affected
the verdict.' ' 193 In Wadle, relied upon by the Harlan II majority, the
misconduct hearings likewise produced much testimony as to whether
the Internet definition of Paxil had any effect on the jurors. 94 Capital
defense investigators and attorneys question the jury as a matter of
course, if their jurisdiction permits it.a95 However, courts cannot
consider much of the evidence the grilling produces because of Rule
606(b). Often, questioning by attorneys during a prejudice hearing
may produce unintended testimony of actual effect.
Because Rule 606(b) stands in the way of hearing this testimony,
the next section considers the merits of an exception to the Rule, and
its polar opposite: associating the common-law corollary of an
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice from extraneous evidence in
capital cases with the Rule.
196
B. Potential Solutions
1. Rule 606(b) Exception
"If one reads through the cases rejecting juror testimony under
Rule 606(b), uncorrected miscarriages of justice leap off of the
page."'
197
One procedural elephant remains in the room. Rule 606(b) all but
requires a typical juror analysis, since the actual jurors cannot testify
as to the actual effects on their sentence. However, the line between
what is testimony as to the effect of extraneous information not
admitted into evidence (and is therefore impermissible), and what
merely characterizes that piece of information (and is therefore
permissible under the exception to Rule 606(b)) can be difficult to
draw. Courts occasionally blur the line between the two tests.
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in McNair v. Campbell, holding
Biblical readings in the jury room can be harmless: "[T]he prayers
and scripture readings in the jury room were intended to encourage,
and had the effect of encouraging, the jurors to take their obligation
'93Harlan II, 109 P.3d 616, 626 (Colo. 2005).
194 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 4, People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004) (No.
03SC340).
195 Some jurisdictions require a court order before juror contact is allowed.
'9 As noted above, the rule presumes the impropriety of extraneous evidence if prejudice
can be shown, but prescribes a method for determining neither.
197 Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 801.
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seriously."' 98 Biblical evidence was held non-prejudicial at the trial
level and by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal, despite the fact that
Alabama has a similar 606(b) rule. 199 In relying upon People v.
Wadle, the Harlan II court ratified the approach taken by the Wadle
Court of Appeals, which used something akin to an actual juror test.
They noted that the Internet definition of Paxil was "of significance to
some, if not all, of the jurors.,0 The Colorado Supreme Court did
not contest this finding. 201 Even the Supreme Court of the United
States occasionally ignores or discounts the effect of the rule.202
Even though courts may blur the line between inadmissible
subjective effect evidence and admissible objective detail evidence,
Rule 606(b)'s plain language prohibits juror testimony as to
subjective effect. Applying Rule 606(b)'s prohibition of testimony
about extraneous information arguably used for the independent
moral assessment yields an ironic result. Centuries ago, the jury was
thought to be a body speaking divine will. 20 3 The idea behind Lord
Mansfield's exclusionary rule was to allow the jury to deliberate in
secret and mystery, ostensibly communing with God. The rule was
originally predicated on religiously grounded fears of tampering with
204that exercise of divine will through the jury system. Yet, today the
rule may require a court to vacate the jury's sentence when that
communion becomes prejudicially intimate.
Lord Mansfield's idea that "a juror may not impeach his own
verdict," should yield to a rule that more accurately reflects reality in
American capital punishment cases. Courts could preserve the
198 McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1308 (11 th Cir. 2005) ("From the testimony at the
hearing, we conclude that the prayers and scripture readings in the jury room were intended to
encourage, and had the effect of encouraging, the jurors to take their obligation seriously and to
decide the question of guilt or innocence based only on the evidence presented from the witness
stand in open court.") (emphasis added) (quoting McNair v. State, 706 So. 2d 828, 838 (1997)).
The McNair court could have been simply "projecting" their conception of the reasonable juror
onto the jury in the case.
199 ALA. R. EvlD. 606(b).
2a People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764, 771 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
201 People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d. 932 (Colo. 2004).
202 See Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 805 (citing cases).
203 Markovitz, supra note 86, at 1505 (citing I WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
EVIDENCE LAW 317 (A.C. Goodhart & H.G. Harbury eds., 7th ed. 1956)). Holdsworth explains
that the jury system replaced the "ordeals" of fire and water and that the Court was not to
inquire into the substance of the jury's deliberations because this would be "impious." Id.
However, this did not stop the King or Queen of England from punishing jurors for returning a
verdict displeasing to the Crown. I JAMES FrlI7AMES STEVEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 305 (London, MacMillan 1883).
20 Markovitz, supra note 86, at 1505; see also GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 5-7 (2002)
("Lacking any claim to divine legitimacy, the jury eventually found a remarkable source of
systemic legitimacy in the secrecy of its deliberation room.").
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purposes of Rule 606(b) while providing a limited exception to the
rule that would prevent the problems highlighted by Harlan 11.205
Rule 606(b)'s endurance is remarkable, and courts will no doubt be
very wary of broadening exceptions to it. The Pandora's Box danger
looms any time courts crack open the lid of a strong prohibition like
Rule 606(b). But the exception this Note proposes could be confined,
and the rule's purposes will still be served.
The exception would be confined in several ways. First, this
exception only applies in capital cases, which are rare. Among capital
cases, only a small subset will involve extraneous evidence. The
exception to Rule 606(b) would concern only these cases. The legal
fiction that usually hides the moles and scars of the jury system will
206
otherwise remain intact.
The purposes of the rule would still be preserved. In capital
punishment, where sentences must often stand the test of twenty
years' time before becoming "final," potentially prejudicial evidence
rules whose purpose is preserving "finality" should bend to allow
closer scrutiny. Indeed, while finality has an "inevitable appeal" in
non-capital cases, capital cases place non-arbitrariness above
finality.2 °7 Careful examination does not grease the machinery of
death, but rather serves to benefit the defendant, the state, and the
public alike. And it is strange indeed that a rule whose purpose is
"finality" should authorize the result in Harlan J.2 08 "Finality" is not
a common virtue of the capital process, with its seemingly endless
litany of appeals available to death-row defendants, many of whom
meet their end by old age rather than execution.2° Most of all, actual
testimony from the jury helps prevent the sort of "guesswork" this
Note has discussed, and could lead to quicker appellate resolution.210
Second, Rule 606(b)'s purpose of preventing jury harassment
would still be served-an evidentiary hearing would still be allowed
only if there were some indication extraneous material was before the
jury.2 ' Moreover, in Harlan II, the jurors had already been
205 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005); see supra pp. 980-83.
206 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 227 (1989) (describing
this legal fiction).
207 Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 803.
2
°8See People v. Wiser, 732 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Colo. 1987) (Erickson, J., specially
concurring).
209Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662
(1986).210 See Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 808.
211 Many federal district courts limit post-verdict questioning of jurors to very specific
circumstances when no misconduct is alleged beforehand. Local court rules also regulate
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"harassed" in the sense of that term used in explicating Rule 606(b)'s
purpose-Investigator Knapp's questionnaire. In cases of extraneous
information, that jurors will be "harassed" is all but certain, because
each juror must testify about that information. This Note proposes
limiting actual effect analysis to extraneous information cases. There,
the court will already ask jurors about their deliberation, and the
"anti-harassment" justification for Rule 606(b) weakens.
Additionally, courts can loosen Rule 606(b)'s prohibition because
the rule serves in large part to preserve a legal fiction. Judges
meticulously instruct juries about how to follow the law. And
reviewing courts presume juries follow the law. But, judges refuse to
admit evidence of the effect of extraneous material on the jury. They
refuse to hear whether the jury has actually followed these
instructions to ignore extraneous information.
When the stakes are especially high-and in capital cases they are
highest-Rule 606(b)'s exceptions should be broadened, and the
"impenetrable legal walls" chipped somewhat.
212
Despite the constant litany of protest against it, recited again
above, Rule 606(b) stands inviolate, as it has for centuries.213 Indeed,
as Justice O'Connor noted in Tanner v. United States:
There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror
misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation
of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror
behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system
could survive such efforts to perfect it.
214
Uproar would accompany any attempt to limit Rule 606(b)'s
reach. Thus, as a solution, it would face a difficult political fight.
215
harassment; many jurisdictions require defense attorneys to show cause before they can question
the jury. If defense attorneys cannot provide the threshold proof required for post-verdict
questioning, then they lose the chance to prove the all-important evidence of extraneous
information. Benjamin M. Lawsky, Note, Limitations on Attorney Postverdict Contact with
Jurors: Protecting the Criminal Jury and its Verdict at the Expense of the Defendant, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1950, 1951 (1994).
212 Ashley, supra note 15, at 157.
21347 Am. Jur. 2D Juries § 2 (2004) (collecting cases that describe the harsh criticism).
214483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987).
215 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 7060 (1974) as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.2051,
2060 (noting disagreement between the House and Senate proposed versions of Rule 606(b))
However, in death penalty procedural and substantive law, persistence clearly is a virtue.
Consider Hitchcock v. Dugger, a Florida capital case. 481 U.S. 393 (1987). The defense
attorney there lodged a facial challenge to the Florida mitigating circumstance statute. Florida's
statute did not feature the typical "any other relevant mitigating evidence" provision, allowing
sentencing jury consideration of all potential mitigating evidence. The defense asserted that
strict adherence to the statutory mitigators thus violated the Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
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Proponents justify the exclusionary rule articulated by Rule 606(b) by
framing the jury system as a good, but not perfectible system.216 But
the Constitution holds the capital jury to the highest standards of any
court. One can make a case, then, that because capital-reviewing
courts should require a nearly perfect performance from the jury, a
limited exception to Rule 606(b) is justified. Furthermore, this
prohibition would allow courts to perform actual effect analysis,
gaining the above-described benefits.
2. Establishing an Irrebutable Presumption of Prejudice
As this Note discussed, a court may struggle to qualify and
interpret the passages of extraneous material read or referenced at
trial, especially when it is moral material. An irrebutable presumption
of prejudice from extraneous evidence during the sentencing phase of
capital trials would prevent the problem altogether. The court could
instruct each juror to report the presence of any extraneous
information to the foreperson. After confirming that extrinsic
evidence was before the jury, the court could either declare a mistrial,
require a re-sentencing and impanel a new jury, or vacate the death
sentence, if the jury imposed one, as it did in Robert Harlan's case.
The court would not care about possibilities of prejudice and actual
effects. Because capital cases may tempt jurors to consult Bibles,
judges should include the Bible in their "no extraneous information"
instruction.
Even so, that will not prevent jurors from consulting outside
information to confirm moral sentiments, and this Note's thesis-that
the independent moral assessment requirement causes confusion-
predicts that they will continue to do so. 217 If the judge does not
specifically prohibit a source, that source is not made any less
extraneous. Similarly, if the judge prohibits a particular source, that
does not make a disobedient juror inherently biased. The problem is
not whether the jurors consult the Bible, the problem is whether they
unjustifiably rely on it in lieu of the governing law. 18 A rule that
(1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), guarantee of a jury consideration of any
potential mitigating evidence, despite threats of sanctions from Florida courts, who had deemed
the argument frivolous. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously
agreed with the defense, and struck down the Florida statute, casting doubt over the morality of
executing the sixteen prisoners punished under the statute since it was passed in the wake of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).216 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at § 247.
217 For instance, a juror might consult religious commentary, or some other item meant to
refresh their moral memory.
218 Hudson, supra note 27.
2007] 1003
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
courts should throw up their hands may be easy to apply, but may not
make much sense, especially because it holds, like all black-and-
white rules, the potential for injustice.
But this system is ripe for perversion. Dishonest jurors, after a
bribe from the defendant, or on their own volition could poison the
deliberations by planting extrinsic evidence. Ideally, voir dire would
help remove these individuals from the jury. But, a system where
sentences must be vacated on such slender grounds gives jurors with
"buyer's remorse" an easy out.2 19 The judge could instruct the jury
about how to report extraneous information, and its consequences.
But, to help solve this problem, judges could treat the instruction like
jury nullification. They could instruct only how to report misconduct
and what to report, leaving out the consequences.
However, whether a juror deliberately introduced the extraneous
information is already a component of a reviewing court's prejudice
analysis. Thus, the trial court could hold a limited evidentiary hearing
seeking only to establish whether the extraneous information was
brought in with the mere intent of scuttling the trial. But this would
raise many of the same concerns of probing jurors' minds for the
actual effect as the subjective analysis advocated above.
If "poisoning" occurred, the judge could require a new trial,
impanel a new jury for sentencing, or vacate the death sentence if the
jurors voted for it. This defect would be sufficient to kill the proposal.
In capital cases, there is less worry about delay. The worry about an
additional trial, or simply demanding from the jury something closer
to perfection is less burdensome in capital trials and could make the
proposal workable. Capital cases are already rarer.
One fear might be that the presence of extraneous information,
particularly of a moral nature, will encourage jurors to cling to the
written text and produce an intractable disagreement about the
appropriate sentence.220 As such, the theory might go, the presence of
extraneous information should raise an irrebutable presumption. The
fear of a philosophical impasse (which is arguably allowed by the
independent moral assessment requirement, and the abolition of
unanimity requirements for mitigating circumstances) must be
untangled from the fear of actual effect (which, I agree, is improper in
all circumstances). Every juror must decide individually how to
weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a capital
219 This might also occur under the actual effect test, but the jury would be bound clearly
by the penalties attending perjury.
220 Harlan H followed this line of thinking.
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sentencing. Contrary to what some observers have argued, jurors are
allowed to advocate different philosophical viewpoints as their basis
-of weighing aggravating circumstances against potential mitigating
221 dsr oasneccircumstances. In their desire to reach a sentence that lets them
sleep at night, they may turn to extraneous materials for guidance.
Such materials are likely to be moral. Their use should be barred. Yet,
if the jury would have easily reached the conclusions to which those
materials guide them on their own, the chance of prejudice
diminishes. Furthermore, religious materials are just as likely to guide
a juror to mercy as to vengeance. In the heightened scrutiny world of
capital cases, courts should look to the jury for details on this intimate
choice, and not rely on their own hypotheses.222
CONCLUSION
"The very concern that we will see what we fear-
arbitrariness in imposing death-counsels that we open our
eyes. ),223
No one should be sentenced to death because of the unenacted
prescriptions of any religion, favored, disfavored, historically
important, or not.224 But when we choose to grant juries the power
underlying the naked choice that is the independent moral assessment,
we must do so with careful scrutiny. An actual effect test, where
courts consider testimony from juries potentially tainted by
extraneous evidence respects both the rights of capital defendants,
221 Compare Egland, supra note 95, at 342. and Ashley, supra note 15, with Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-406 (1978), and Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 46 (2004) (per curiam)
(quoting Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001), which describes the jury's weighing of
mitigating evidence as a "reasoned moral response").
222 There are many other potential solutions whose discussion is beyond the scope of this
Note. Because of the independent moral assessment requirement, the more likely extraneous
material is being used for an independent moral assessment, the less likely it is to be prejudicial.
Thus, one interesting option that would more effectively cabin an exception to Rule 606(b)
would be some form of burden-shifting, where the government could seek to show that that was
the purpose for which the jury used it before actual effect analysis kicked in. Also, one tempting
solution would be just to admit the Bible as part of the record. This technique has been tried by
prosecutors sparingly, and usually without success. See, e.g., Jones v. Francis, 312 S.E.2d 300,
303 (Ga. 1984); Jones v. Kemp, 706 F. Supp. 1534, 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that the trial
court erred when it permitted jurors to take the Bible into the jury room).
223 Hoeffel, supra note 168, at 814-15.
224Te true danger of substitution of the laws made by man with laws purporting to
emanate from a higher authority is certain, to even the most conservative commentators. See
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 355 (1990) ("[W]hen man's law has been
thoroughly weakened and discredited, and when powerful forces have a different version of
God's law or the higher morality, we may find that the actual rights of the Constitution and the
democratic institutions that protect us may have all been flattened.").
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and the interests of citizens in a jury system that hands down a
sentence with the appropriate factors in mind and commensurate with
the facts of the case.
This Note has attempted to do several things. First, it sought to
survey the existing landscape of capital sentencing law, showing its
departure from the usual criminal model. Then, this Note sought to
show that a religiously-charged mood often dominates capital trials.
From there, this Note sought to outline how an actual effect test might
work, and to make the best justification for it. Though certainly not
built on unassailable premises, the actual effect test has the advantage
of being limitable to only those circumstances where it would work
best-by cabining the exceptions that permit it to a small subset of
capital cases. This helps to justify any perturbation in the legal status
quo, like an exception to Rule 606(b).
As explained above, actual effect testing is not prohibitively
inefficient. It adds another check against arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. It would remove from courts the uncomfortable
function of religious exegesis, and place the duty of explanation on
jurors. It reflects the difficult and ambiguous task that jurors must
perform in capital deliberations. It lets the jurors aver for themselves
if they discharged their task properly. Finally, it defuses claims of
illegitimacy the public will make when reviewing courts overturn jury
sentences for reasons contravened or undermined by record evidence.
The typical juror test under Rule 606(b) is overinclusive-in some
cases, courts will think a Biblical passage prejudiced the minds of a
typical juror, when it did not prejudice the minds of the actual jurors.
But the test is also dangerously underinclusive-in some cases, courts
will not think a Biblical passage prejudiced the mind of a typical
juror, when it did prejudice the minds of the actual jurors to the
detriment of the defendant.
And if they can elude a reviewing court in this way, the Gideons
might find their mark next time.
JOHNNY HUTCHINSON
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